Michael Flynn; Can Russia be Persuaded to Break with Iran? Part 2

We continue Michael Flynn; Can Russia be Persuaded to Break with Iran? with an explanation of the “no” prediction. The several paragraphs that follow are supposed to jerk the American reader out of his particular pragmatic mindset, so as to appreciate the Russian mindset. You can skip them if you’re already there.

The expression “pragmatic foreign policy” has suffered the usual fate of the politicized; it’s been devalued. The general idea is that a pragmatic idea pursues realizable, tangible goals.  Perhaps it is best nailed down by it’s opposites: romantic. fanciful, wishful, dreamlike. But U.S. policy has always incorporated elements of the romantic. Perhaps the romantic part  is never decisive.  Cynics call it window dressing.

The  simple fact that democracies esteem each other, and the mutual dislike or distrust of democracies for nondemocratic regimes, promotes a fusion of the above.  But precise introspection is necessary to fully understand the different framework of an adversary. A consequence of pragmatism is not to think too far ahead of events. Every step of projection involves an element of imagination, pulling further away from the anchors of the current reality. When it’s good, it’s called contingency planning. In criticism, it becomes “not pragmatic.” Where to draw the line is elastically dependent upon personalities.

From our island continent/fortress, we watch the goings-on in Eurasia with a certain detachment of timescale. On this scale, the chessboard movements occur at a sedate pace. Nothing can happen in a day, month, or even a season, that will have more consequence than knock a point off the GNP. As a result, we tend to think of foreign policy goals as static, durable achievements. We might qualify this with, “Nothing lasts forever, but…”

The time scale diminishes as one gets closer to the action. The scale defined by the speed of a bullet, the warning time of an airstrike, or the time it takes to infiltrate and concentrate across a porous border; these are the concerns of a continental power. To such a power, there are no static goals. Foreign policy is a constant balancing act. Russia is a continental power.

Flynn’s desire that Russia  “break with Iran” is a consequence of American pragmatism. It implies that a chessboard solution to the regional problems  would be facilitated by a break. But to the Russian, continental mindset, it would simply be the removal of one potential balancing wheel, with points of influence, from the potentialities of solution.

The above is one distillation of thought. As always, there are others.  In the Middle East, beginning with  the rivalry of the Seven Sisters, it has been accepted as civilized behavior  to back opposing proxies. It doesn’t contradict diplomacy, trade, or cocktails in the evening. Russia-Turkey relations are a current example, with reasonably cordial relations and trade, in spite of conflict via proxies.

Positive, rather than negative, relations with Iran are important to Russia. Iran is dominantly Shiite. The Russian Caucasus, and the greater, dominantly Sunni 14% Muslim minority of Russia, are vulnerable to radicalization via porous southern borders. Shiite dominance of Iran acts as the equivalent of the species barrier of a biological pathogen. It is a cultural barrier to radicalization, instrumental to reducing the vulnerability of Russia to Sunni jihadist influence. It also reflects  Russian thinking that Shia Islam, though on an expansionist kick,  does not spawn stateless terrorism.

All students of history are acquainted with the concept of balance-of-power. In the 19th century, it was a phrase of the man on the street. For Russia, in the Middle East,  the meaning has transmuted a little. The modern goal is to direct the energies of smaller, neighboring powers, so that they cannot form a combination against Russia. Polarization with Iran, by accession to Michael Flynn’s wish, would remove Iran from the activity of balance. But Russia’s history teaches there can be no end to the balancing.

Although a “break” with Iran is not in the offing, effective cooperation is possible. But  Flynn does not appear to have appreciated the deficit of mutual trust. It cannot be unwound by mere conciliation.  I give my personal opinion that Ukraine  should be resolved first. Had it not been an issue at the time of Russia’s intervention in Syria, Russia’s proposal to jointly fight ISIS with the U.S. would have been received with greater consideration.

This is an opportunity for the skilled U.S. negotiator to take another look at  Linkage as a Foreign Policy Technique for the Trump Administration.

Next: Development of a Trump Middle East policy.

 

 

 

Should Fox Apologize to Putin?

Reuters:  Kremlin says it wants apology from Fox News over Putin comments.  Quoting,

Fox News host Bill O’Reilly described Putin as “a killer” in the interview with Trump as he tried to press the U.S. president to explain more fully why he respected his Russian counterpart. O’Reilly did not say who he thought Putin had killed.

O’Reilly’s comments are in line with (CNN) Mitch McConnnel’s, who called Putin a thug. This tragic emphasis on words of vilification is the result of our fear Trump will give away the store, acting as the perhaps unwitting collaborator with an adversary. A few years from now, this could be true,  in fact, or opinion, or not at all. But we’re scared. We have a right to be.

After I had studied Vladimir Putin for a while, I realized that it is impossible to separate the man from the world in which he is embedded. It is an ethnocentric world of corrupt institutions and extrajudicial punishments,  coexisting with a western yearning that willed the  city of St. Petersburg into existence. In this milieu, there is a significant minority of completely modern  people who have hybridized themselves with the west. They are just like us, a confusing veneer.

Russia is demarcated by the world’s longest borders on which hostilities are conceivable. It has a population density of only 8.4 people per square kilometer, but it is highly urbanized. Most of the country is vacant, and lacking transport for quick mobilization, which is why the new Russian main battle tank weighs little more than a Sherman. Russia is indefensible from attack by an external actor, state or non-state, that activates ethnic tensions.

This affects the character of Russia and her rulers, in ways that are obvious, while the underlying psychology of threat remains hidden. Russia is constantly in search of security with respect to the nations that surround her. The search includes aggression. Putin is Russia’s current voice, but the theme is historical.

What we know that is distinctly about Putin the individual, as opposed to “Russia/Putin”, is extremely limited. A telling example, because it was so closely studied, is the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko. The final words of High Court judge Robert Owen’s report were, (Washington Post) “The FSB operation to kill Mr. Litvinenko was probably approved by Mr. [Nikolai] Patrushev [then head of the FSB] and also by President Putin.” I consider it a significant possibility, with all the motives in place, but not a probability. Too many members of Russia’s elite and intelligence establishment wanted Litvinenko dead. Of course, Owen may have access to classified information that I do not.

That is the closest we’ve ever gotten to incriminating Vladimir Putin. Russia has seen many unfortunate killings of journalists and muck rakers, but it is a land of many gangs and turfs. More than rule, Putin presides. He seemed to regret the death of Boris Nemtsov, a truely respectable man. It resulted in a police action that extended into Chechnya, with a messy ending. The ultimate instigators, looping back to Russian nationalists, may have escaped punishment. In the Russia that Putin inhabits, that may be the best one can expect.

The Russians have the Second Chechen War, and our fathers have the Vietnam War. We are not our fathers, but we have to acknowledge that about 388,000 tons of napalm were dropped in Vietnam between 1963 and 1973. By various means, the Vietnam war claimed between 195,000–430,000 civilian casualties. The very highest estimate of civilian casualties in Chechnya is 250,000, but the Society for Threatened Peoples International estimates 80,000.

So with an approximation of Chechnya tactics in Syria, Russia today is roughly comparable to the U.S.A. of 60 years ago, during the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. Yet many of us remember Johnson as a kind, if domineering man. The road to Hell is paved with good intentions.

I hope the above does not end up as an “alternative fact.” But in the stress of the current presidency, we risk making ourselves stupid. There no point in labeling Putin-the-man, because, with respect to our needs and concerns, Putin and Russia are one and the same. We’ve dealt with the Russians when they were much more adversarial than they are now. Under Reagan, the slogan was  “trust but verify.” Ironically, this is a Russian proverb.

We cannot rely on Fox News to preserve the Republic. That task falls to Mitch McConnell. I hope Senator McConnell’s vigilance will be informed by the quote of Henry Kissinger below.

On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and interim SALT agreement. On page 1254 of White House Years, Henry Kissinger writes,

For as far ahead as we can see, America’s task will be to re-create and maintain the two pillars of our policy toward the Soviet Union that we began to build in Moscow: a willingness to confront Soviet expansionism and a simultaneous readiness to mark out a cooperative future. A more peaceful world is prevented if we lean too far in either direction. When conciliation becomes an end in itself, a ruthless Soviet policy can turn it, as it occasionally has, into an instrument  of blackmail and a cover for unilateral gains…”

 Today, this resonates  with strong analogy.

Доверяй, но проверяй

Michael Flynn; Can Russia be Persuaded to Break with Iran?

Bloomberg: Trump Team Aims to Test Russia’s Alliance With Iran.  The most provocative statement comes up front:

As the Trump administration begins planning its outreach to Moscow, one question for the new president will be whether he can persuade Russia to turn away from Iran.

This is then restated with slight moderation,

“…they will explore the extent to which Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to end this relationship and cooperate with U.S. policy to counter Iranian aggression in Syria and the Middle East. ”

and then with the tentativeness of realism:

“It’s important to find out what are the limits of Russia’s willingness to cooperate with us with regard to Iran,” said Michael Ledeen, who during the transition served as an adviser to Michael Flynn…”

These are  lot of words to fuzz the issue. Does Flynn really imagine a breakup is possible, or is it an opening gambit? Some of the best reporting comes from Al-Monitor’s Hamidrez Azizi, an Iranian.  In Why are Syrian rebels stepping up efforts to isolate Iran?, he writes

It seems that the main impetus behind the rebels’ disinclination toward an Iranian role is their hope that more serious US involvement on the Syrian issue under Donald Trump’s administration could prompt Moscow to reconsider its ties with Tehran, which, in the end, could result in a diminished Iranian role in the equation of the future of Syria.

That this kind of reporting could come out of Tehran is a remarkable illustration of the dichotomy of Iran’s politics, dominated by the sometimes visible, sometimes hidden hand of the Qom establishment. With another shift, the writer could be imprisoned.

Let’s pose a question, of the type that might have appeared on the website of the IARPA  “Forecasting World Events” crowd sourcing project:

“Will Trump’s administration succeed in convincing Russia to break with Iran?”

As a crowd sourcing  question, the question by itself is not enough. Rigorous, reportable, decidable criteria for a “yes” must accompany it, such as:

“If any of the following occur, as reported by recognized media, by such-and-such a date:”

  • A rupture of diplomatic relations.
  • Hostilities between Russia and Iran.
  • Restriction of arms supply by Russia to Iran. This includes an ambiguity: sales or deliveries?
  • A vote by Russia in the P5+1 framework against Iran.

My prediction would be “no.”

To be continued shortly.

 

I lived with a Muslim Family for Five Years

I have been wondering what I could write about the current immigration controversy that would be worth reading. My personal feelings about immigration have no weight and little relevance. But then I thought of something. I lived with a Muslim family for five years.

In what follows, bear in mind that I am a secular person. I do not empathize with what believers call “faith”, though I understand the attraction very well. It seems to be something that most people need in some form. I am more in tune with Stephen Hawking. I have no trouble with abstractions. Most people do.

We had a family member who suffered a long illness requiring 24 hour care. Such care is affordable only from people on the margins of existence. This Muslim family of native-born Americans came to our house, from the inner city, as caregivers. They lived on a dead-end street dominated by drug dealers. Gunfire was frequent. For the head of the family, the challenge was keeping his own home inviolate. Drug dealers would literally trespass the inside of their dwelling. Their travails included every aspect of existence. Yet they acquired and kept an insular pride.

The household head was the first convert to Islam. Although he had never been to college, he learned Arabic, became fluent in Islamic theology, made Hajj, and became the external spokesperson for his mosque. He remarked that returning home, he felt so much better, so fortunate, to be back in the United States. He expressed affection for this country. Some of his opinions were troubling. His mosque had been one of the first in the U.S. to condemn terrorism in most cases. I would have preferred to hear, “all cases.” He believed that a caliphate is the ideal form of government. I favor strict separation of church and state. He wanted his wife to wear the burqa, but she refused. There was no evidence of subordinate status. They had family democracy.

I think they converted because Islam offered more than other creeds of order, identity, and, to some extent,  self-imposed isolation from an environment hostile to good intent. These ulterior motives are hidden from the believers themselves.

His wife was the caregiver. They had a vulnerable daughter, and a gaggle of extended family they brought to live with us. Food tended to vanish from the fridge. I complained, and they brought it back. They were, if not on the edge of starvation, chronically underfed.

One day the whole crew showed up, including their best conversion specialist, a woman in burqa. I was the target. She cited their holy book as a “self revealing text”. This is a recognized theological term,  meaning that a text serves as its own proof.  If I only read it, I would know it was true. She asserted that I must be desirous to know the origin of all things, which, she alleged, the text would provide. She whacked away at it with the expertise of the best cult recruiter. As a special fruit, she alleged that Islam contradicted no science. But she said that she was glad she had been converted before going to college. She felt it resulted in stronger faith (“It took better…”) than had it been the other way around.

Since my own secular ontological holdings are beyond the comprehension of most people, I decided on the “possum defense”, to play dead. I feigned no curiosity. They tried to arouse it. I played the dullest person imaginable, interested only in sitcoms and the dinner menu. It went round and round. If they had not by now become intimates, it might have been interesting to bait them. After three hours, they gave up in disgust.

But our friendship was untarnished. Knowing that I was beyond the reach of conversion, they never tried again. They served until the last dying breath. Some weeks later, the severance was exhausted. They were desperate again. On two occasions, I slipped the wife small sums of money. When the family head found out about it, payment for no work, he was extremely angry, and forbade it.

Our last contact was an unexpected visit some years later. The caregiver herself was now mortally ill. He brought her to our house to remember the good times. I don’t remember the prolonged illness of a family member as a good time, but I was gratified that they did.

This is one experience with Islam. There are other experiences, which is why the debate is so wrenching.

 

 

Iran’s New Missile — A Mere Detail in an Abstract Problem, Part 1

It is a mere detail, emphasized by the human desire for the tangible. Iran is really an abstract problem, but let’s get the tangible out of the way.

The best technical descriptions are given by Al-Monitor’s What’s so special about Iran’s latest missile? and the  Arms Control Wonk article Iran’s New Missile, by Joshua Pollack.

Qualitatively, this is the difference. Missiles indigenous to the region have been primitive scrap-metal monsters with vestigial guidance systems. The Qiam-1 is Iran’s first smart, agile missile. Like China’s carrier killer Dong-Feng 21, it takes inspiration from the Pershing II. Scrapped by 1991, the Pershing II was historically innovative. Even today, the Pershing II is remarkable.  If you want to see what Iran is aiming for, read the Wikipedia article.

Like the German V-2, and the many imitations in use to the present day, such as the Scud, it is liquid fueled. This makes it cheap, and possible to use and fire in large quantities. In the middle east, cheap missiles have traditionally been used as barrage weapons. They lack the accuracy required to take out compact, high value targets. The new missile incorporates warhead winglets, which could be used in two ways:

  • Evade an antimissile system with high-g maneuvers at altitudes lower than the Kármán Line.
  • Terminal course correction for pinpoint accuracy.

This would require a guidance system that Iran does not have. There have been four major steps:

  • The first solution, devised in the 50’s by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, used gyroscopes and accelerometers, and operated without reference to the external world.
  • Next came the star-tracker, used to refine the inertial system.
  • This was followed by terrain recognition systems. These are commonly associated with cruise missiles, but they have been used by ballistic missiles that have fairly flat trajectories, such as the Pershing II.
  • GPS is the state of the art, but requires a huge infrastructure outside the missile itself. Iran has none, and if it did, it would be extremely vulnerable.

Is it a “nuclear capable” missile? In the West, an elaborate and real distinction exists between weapons systems designed for nuclear versus  conventional weapons. This is the result of the elaborate  support systems required to handle and target nukes with stringent levels of reliability and safety.  In particular,

  • Nuclear guidance systems are less accurate but more autonomous than guidance systems for smart bombs. If a nuclear weapon lands within a few  hundred yards of the target, it will usually do the job. But there is a premium on that hundreds-of- yards circle. A smart bomb must land dead on, but as many bombs as required for a direct hit can be used.
  • Nuclear weapons have elaborate safety interlocks that extend to the delivery platform, plane or missile. The release of a nuclear weapon is not a mere trigger squeeze.
  • At the level of consideration given by rogue countries to the above, there is no particular distinction for a nuclear capable weapon.

Now the Trump Administration has come down hard on Iran for testing this missile, which also worries France. But the argument that it is a treaty violation is the consequence of a defectively written treaty. The treaty bans development of a nuclear capable missile. For Iran, any missile will do.

To be continued shortly.

 

Linkage as a Foreign Policy Technique for the Trump Administration

Linkage, first given foreign policy meaning by Henry Kissinger, hasn’t been around for a while. He defines it on page 129 of White House Years:

“In our view, linkage existed in two forms: first, when a diplomat deliberately links two separate objectives in a negotiation, using one as leverage on the other; or by virtue of reality, because in an interdependent  world, the actions  of a major power are inevitably related and have consequences beyond the issue or region concerned.”

The first is like a parenting style, bargaining with a child to obtain good behavior.  The second is experienced by the exhausted parent at an evening meditation session, contemplating  the connectedness of all things.

Ronald Regan’s secretary of state, George Shultz, repudiated linkage.  Quoting from The  NY Times, October 19, 1984, “SHULTZ SAYS U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS ARE LIKELY TO IMPROVE, BUT SLOWLY”:

Aside from his assertions that the way is open for improved relations in coming years, the most novel aspect of Mr. Shultz’s speech dealt with his argument against the policy of ”linkage” – retaliation against the Russians in one area for something done in another. ”There will be times” when linkage might be appropriate, he said, but on the whole, ”linkage as an instrument of policy has limitations.”

The rejection of linkage was based on the  failure, in the preceding dozen years or so, to prevent the numerous Third World revolutions sponsored by the Soviet Union. So Schultz relegated it to “tactical” status, meaning that although it might fit a specific problem, it was not the overarching theme of American foreign policy.

 We give something a name, and it suddenly becomes real. But linkage comes naturally to any good negotiator. “You give me this and I’ll give you that.” And Kissinger was arguably the best negotiator the U.S. has ever had in foreign policy. Most of those who came before and after learned by OJT (on-the-job-training), too late and too little.

Schultz served an ideologue, Ronald Reagan, albeit one of the better ones. An Ideologue simplifies reality to fit a framework. To an ideologue, the failures of the previous ideology, or lack of one, resulted from errors. Schultz  logically concluded that the error was linkage. It may not have occurred to him that his own counterfactual history, featuring some word other than linkage, might have turned out pretty much the same.

With linkage off the table, we’ve had a theme shortage. Since 2000, we’ve seen these second-rate, long winded themes:

So what is linkage, anyway? Before it was inducted into textbooks, it was the natural tool of the skilled negotiator. It’s not the only note, but a strong one. It’s not a solution, but it’s a note to hit.

How can such a useful concept be rejected, as Kissinger asserts, in favor of “the pragmatic tradition”? The word itself is a call to be skillful. If you bluster too much, too often,  people will tune you out. But nobody tunes out linkage.

To be continued.

Donald Trump’s Internal Conflicts

It’s hard to compete against the non-stop drama of the Trump White House. Who needs “West Wing”?

Trump’s presentation is blustery. Many of us are deeply worried that Trump will impact cherished values and accomplishments, at least of liberals and environmentalists, beyond repair. This short note offers the possibility, not probability, that Trump’s points of view will evolve in unexpected directions. It takes note of unexpected diversity in Trump’s selection of his inner circle and unusual expressions of thought. On diversity,

  • Jared Kushner is obvious.
  • Steve Bannon represents a right wing element not heretofore seen in the White House.
  • Michael Flynn is a registered, pro-life Democrat.
  • Trump wanted to offer Romney the cabinet post of secretary of state. In the campaign, Romney criticized Trump severely, down to the personal level.

On inner conflict resolution, in Trump’s own mind,

This has all been out for a long time. I’ve put it neatly on a page to consider it from the psychological perspective. Trump seems to be a person of active internal conflict, who argues with himself as much as with others.

It is possible that Trump is changeable. By implication of the above, he may be the kind of person who will recognize, perhaps not immediately, that eradication of our liberal heritage will result in a one term presidency. Steve Bannon has one ear (Hollywood Reporter):

If we deliver” — by “we” he means the Trump White House — “we’ll get 60 percent of the white vote, and 40 percent of the black and Hispanic vote and we’ll govern for 50 years. That’s what the Democrats missed. They were talking to these people with companies with a $9 billion market cap employing nine people. It’s not reality. They lost sight of what the world is about.”

There is something to this, but dissecting it with full attention must await a future post. But Trump’s other ear may listen more widely. He may come to realize that identifying the above issue, as important as it is, as the only issue, ignores a wide spectrum of concern in the electorate.

If I could imagine that someone shows this to Trump, or one of his advisors, my top concern is this. You may think that global warming is unproven, or worse, a conspiracy of fraud. But very few things can be believed with better than 90% certainty. You hold the planet in your hands. Think about that 10%. Whatever happens to the planet on  your watch cannot be undone.

What if you’re wrong?

 

CNN, Shame, Shame!

   I’ve called out CNN twice before, for serious factual errors. This error occurs in Fighting flares in eastern Ukraine, dateline “Updated 6:39 PM ET, Tue January 31”. The “Story Highlights” states, “Russia says rebels are using banned weapons.”

Wrong. Ukraine says it. And even if it came over the wire like that, a little common sense says that Russia would not impugn their own proxies. Fact check time?

For preceding events, see CNN, Shame! Raise Your Standards! “Russia unveils ‘Satan 2 Missile” According to CNN, Russia  has a Russian missile that can loft an entire dealer lot-full of SUVs. This is false.

When in January ’16, I pointed out that the CNN report that a B-52 bomber flew over the Korean DMZ was false, and would have been an act of war had it occurred, they made the appropriate correction. In the case of the missile, they did not. Perhaps they checked with their stringer, who replied “It must be true. That’s what my source told me.” Or perhaps they just don’t care.

In this case of who said what, there might be some people who would catch this not-so- subtle error. It certainly would mark a major change in the Russian position if they had stated what you said they did. CNN, your mistake is significant.

What’s the problem, CNN? Too busy scoring music? Time to double down and get it right.

Trump White House vows to stop China taking South China Sea islands

Reuters: Trump White House vows to stop China taking South China Sea islands. Creating a climate of fear and uncertainty is an excellent way to stop U.S. investment and outsourcing in China. But repatriation of assets would undoubtedly be blocked. Is it gamesmanship?

Most of the Sea is within a zone in which China has a massive advantage in power projection. But there is exactly one place in the South China Sea where the vow could conceivably be fulfilled: Mischief Reef, 9°55′N 115°32′E.  To  the west, Vietnam. To the east, Palawan Island, part of the Philippines. To the south, the Austronesian nations. All of these nations are within China’s economic orbit, most quasi non-aligned. But if the region could be magnetized in the U.S. direction, China could lose the advantage of power projection.

If this sounds too theoretical, refer to the way crows (Chinese Navy) fight off birds of prey (U.S. eagle). The less powerful but more numerous crows defeat predators by mobbing. But mobbing requires the home court advantage.

Remotely, if a U.S. presence was substantially restored to the former Subic Bay naval station, Scarborough Shoal, 15°11′N 117°46′E, becomes possible. The critical Philippines are absent from the alignment. But on January 17,  their foreign minister, on January 17 said

“They said that they would prevent China from doing or undertaking these kind of activity. If it wants to do that, they have the force to do so, let them do it,” Yasay said, referring to Tillerson’s remarks on Wednesday to U.S. senators.

For a new China vassal, this has curious nuance. And on January 16, the Philippines filed a diplomatic protest.

Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay told CNN Philippines it was important to raise concerns carefully, and not create a big row.

“I just want to assure the Filipino people that when we take action at engaging China in this dispute, we do not want to take such aggressive, provocative action that will not solve the problem,” he said.

There has been an amusing parallel between the Trump confirmation hearings, in which  nominees opposed the Trump campaign plank, and  Duterte’s “bye-bye” to the U.S. alliance, with subsequent statements by Yasay attempting to reverse the damage. To wit:

If “nothing” happens, the gambit would still be a bold and probably effective method to break the trust of U.S. corporations in China investments.  If action were in the offing, would there be signs? I’d rather not say.   Philippine politics is a noisy place, like the engine room of a ship keeping station, all clanging bells and rudder changes. Duterte vilified the U.S. daily for months before “bye-bye.”

Keep your ear to the ground.

 

Trump Target: Yemen

Yahoo: Hope, and fear, as US Gulf allies look to Trump.  Their lamp-rubbing will be rewarded.

The sole reason for U.S. disengagement in Yemen has been the incidence of “accidental” Saudi airstrikes with large civilian casualties. Saudi explanations did not convince U.S. strike planners. So, rather than behave like the Russians, who, some think, acted on Assad requests with too little concern for collateral casualties, or simply didn’t care, the U.S. withdrew strike planning staff in August 2016.

U.S. foreign policy is about to get a heavy dose of realpolitik. But even so, the decision to use force depends not simply on moral standard, but how force will serve the national interest. It is not in the interests of the realpolitik practitioner to attempt force in non-permissive theaters.

While Iraq is, by geography, ideal for frustrating Iranian westward expansion, it is now just a barely permissive environment. In Is Iraq Headed for Another Civil War?, I wrote,

This is the advanced age and delicate health of Iraq’s senior cleric, Ali al-Sistani. Compared to Iran’s ample religious establishment, Iraq’s is relatively spare.  Sistani is  relatively progressive, what we would want an ayatollah to be if we had to have one. That Iraq has any independent religious establishment at all is due to his seniority. Sistani has been protective of Iraq as an independent political entity, a concern not shared by the infiltrative power brokers of Qom.

When Sistani passes, Iraq will be a completely non-permissive environment for U.S. action against Iran.  Yemen does not have quite the same geographic blocking potential. But it offers proactive proxies, eager to conduct a proxy war with the mutual interest of the U.S.

 But Aladdin’s fable has both the lamp and the ring. The lamp, stolen, falls into the hands of an evil sorcerer, who now controls the more powerful  genie. The evil of the story is represented in the dire straits of Yemen, a nation running out of water, mired in poverty, drug addiction, and war. The Gulf States showed no interest in the uplift of Yemen before the revolt of the Houthis. With cheap oil, they will continue with the tradition of the cheap fix.

As is frequently the case,  realpolitik contains a moral dilemma. Some practitioners find solace in a greater good. Sometimes there is none. These are the sides of the coin:

  • Iran’s government is inimical to western values. It may have the ambitions of a larger caliphate, anchored in the theological certainty that to us is a kind of poison. Since the Iranian Revolution, Iran’s theological government has engaged in episodic versions of the French Terror. We have no assurance they will not reprise.
  • Iran’s government has an organizing principle that may hold the only chance to bring Yemen back from Malthusian catastrophe. Western culture is too distant. With the exception of Egypt, Sunni culture is itself is too challenged from within.

Recent experience, and reevaluation of U.S. foreign policy since World War II suggests that proactive policy, which in this case means full-on support of proxies in Yemen, would not achieve a result considered “good” by advocates.  One line of reasoning holds hope by a thin thread. Hold the fort in Yemen until Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reform drive takes hold.

Then Yemen can be the region’s Mexico, a source of cheap labor.

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