(CNN) Iran renews restrictions on Strait of Hormuz as peace talks approach a critical juncture. Quoting,

• Strait closure: Iran says it is once again shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, blaming the US for “breaches of trust” during the ongoing ceasefire. The move may threaten momentum toward a peace deal between the two countries.

The above is a bit watery. On November 3, 2026, the U.S. will still be at war with Iran. The basis is the innate character of the Iranian regime, which cannot be altered. This has been discussed in fine detail in previous posts; here is the summation:

• There is a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of the enemy, which it is thought can be pressured to behave as a rational actor.
• The overarching war strategy has been to create conditions for a rational actor (according to our definition) to emerge, to accede to U.S. demands.
• The  Iranians believe they can manage the privations of the oil blockade better than the West.
• The Iranians believe they can manage civilian suffering with oppression.
• Control of the Strait is a weapon for which the U.S. has no effective countermeasure.
• The IRG anticipates that November will see the sunset of U.S. operations. That is not long in the scheme of things. They anticipate that as the date approaches, Trump will declare victory and disengage.

The enemy is not a rational actor as we understand it. We don’t have to look outside Western civilization for examples. In the closing days of WWII, in the  Battle of Berlin. In two weeks, 92,000–100,000 German soldiers and 125,000 civilians  lost their lives. Why was the Wehrmacht unable to concede the inevitable?  Fear of Russian revenge was one factor. The personal loyalty oath of Wehrmacht officers to Hitler has direct analogy to Iran’s authoritarian theocracy, however warped it may be by the IRG. A third reason: In the extremity, they had no  time to think.

Even if there exists a moderate faction, it is almost a mathematical theorem that radical elements will dominate, displacing moderates.  Radicals tend to be meaner and more violent than moderates; hence radicals kill more moderates than moderates kill radicals. See (Brinton) The Anatomy of Revolution. Corollary. This cannot change from external pressure. Social order can only be changed up close, as by an occupying force.

It doesn’t matter whether Vance or Rubio negotiate. For Iran, negotiations are nothing more than a smokescreen. To avoid strategic defeat, completely different tactics are required.

There are many ways to classify war. One is intensity. High intensity is the preferred modality for advanced powers, leveraging technology and industry to minimize casualties. Low intensity is the only option available to insurgencies, and remains an option for developing countries. It has been so successful that one wag advises throwing out all the textbooks on counterinsurgency, because they were written by the losers. Afghanistan, Vietnam, and  the 2003 Iraq occupation that followed invasion were asymmetric, where the U.S. / allied effort was mostly high  intensity, against low-intensity insurgent opponents.

With isolated exceptions, such as the occupied Philippines during WW2 (see Wendell Fertig), the Green Berets in Vietnam / small scale ops elsewhere, and an abortive effort in Syria during the Obama administration, U.S. history shows a strong preference for high intensity warfare. Iran is perhaps the most audacious, with an all-air approach that maximizes intensity per combatant. Optimistic predictions were likely based on Iran’s preference for the same.  Simultaneous decapitation and destruction of Iran’s high-intensity base would leave it with “no cards to play.” They actually have a whole other deck. We can “bomb them back to the Stone Age”, as was attempted in Vietnam, only to find they have backup spears, furs, and flints. This is one of Clausewitz’s choices. We don’t decide what the Iranians need to fight. They do.

It was anticipated that, even with an Iranian “backup deck”, the regime would collapse. Here logic was replaced by faulty intuition. Quoting from What Are the Mullahs of Iran Thinking?,

An insurgency is vital to seize power; otherwise it will simply lapse to surviving elements of the current regime.

High intensity warfare has another limitation. It deprives the adversary of time to change their mind.  Readers who have spouses are doubtless familiar with the tactic of wearing down, or being worn down, conceding over time what is unthinkable in an instant.

The alternative. We need to flip the script, with the current maximal intensity reduced to something like what Israelis call “mowing the lawn. This can be a hybrid approach; we don’t have to go all the way in that direction, but the level must be sustainable indefinitely. But how does the switch open the Strait?

Negotiation with Iran has been proven not to work. So replace it. The broad success of B.F. Skinner’s operant conditioning, with animals as diverse at rats and humans, suggests Iranians are not likely to be immune. See Advice for a New Secretary of State, Part 6; How to Use a Skinner Box. Quoting,

We want the Russians to cease subversion of our political process via social media and fake news.  B.F. Skinner’s numerous publications explain in general terms how this should be done. Now let’s get specific.  A U.S. response, what Skinner calls the reinforcer,  to inhibit the Russian operant,  should:

• • • Occur quickly after the operant, preferably overlapping the operant itself.
    • Be  implemented according to Skinner’s research on schedules. This rules out actions that are one-shots, without the possibility of unlimited repetition.

The reinforcer is transit of the Strait, a set of rules that determine how often, how much, and where-to Iran may transit the Strait in response to successful  transit by U.S. allies. The rules do not have to be simple; they can be capricious and punitive, but they must be consistent. The rules must represent the cheaper alternative to aggression. The Skinner box buys the Iranians time to think.

The alternative also buys  time to establish an insurgency. It is potentially politically durable, removing the Iranian anticipation that they only have to hold out until political pressure in the U.S. terminates U.S. action.

Quoting from (CNN) Trump agrees to two-week ceasefire with Iran; Strategic Deadlock,

Some time before the last battle, when things become obvious, four trends are possible:

• • • • We’re winning, and we know it.
      • We’re losing, and we know it.
      • We’re winning, but we think we’re losing.
      • We’re losing, but we think we’re winning.

One possibility was left out, the current situation of strategic deadlock. Both parties can sustain the conflict almost indefinitely.

Both the present and the future remain in doubt.