(CNN) Israeli foreign minister: Trump admin. didn’t force Israel into accepting ceasefire.
The strategies of Hezbollah and Hamas have been similar, with
- Quasi state attributes.
- Broad application of terror.
- Goals of conflict exceeding terror, at levels of conventional war necessary to destroy a state.
While Hezbollah prepared meticulously for undated future action, Hamas took bold, précipité action, intending to establish a new reality, perhaps to drag other belligerents into active conflict.
When the early predictions of pundits were that Israeli intervention into Gaza would be surgically informed by precise intelligence, I knew the opposite. I chose not to share this because, despite whatever misgivings I may have, I am not an impartial observer. Rather than mislead, I simply chose not to write about it at all.
The near total physical destruction of the infrastructure of Gaza was mandated by the inability of Israeli forces to successfully implement a surgical approach with these goals:
- Combat losses minimized to a level sustainable for the duration of the conflict.
- Sufficiently complete destruction of Hamas so as to impede regeneration.
- Creation of a political vacuum in which a new civil authority can be created.
- Destruction of the myth that with enough stockpiling, digging, training, and waiting, the Intifada could achieve asymmetric parity with Israel.
What remains of political Hamas cannot spin the result of this conflict as a conditional or partial victory. In consequence, a certain percentage of Gazans, an as yet unknown but very important number, will resist the attempts of Hamas to resume. Whether this creates a political vacuum remains to be seen.
Hezbollah was seen as the far more formidable adversary. Their undoing began as a technological masterstroke; see Israel’s Sabotage Coup; How to Make an Exploding Pager. While the highly acceptable result has not been so nearly complete as with Hamas, the loss to Iran of Syria as a support land bridge has amplified the achievement.
These twin results, as pleasant as they may be to contemplate in the short term, are seeds of future conflict, abetted by the cultural myths and memes prevalent in the region. Quoting from In the New Year; The False God of Expertise; What to do on New Years Eve?,
Histories of mankind have various perspectives: politics, culture, technology, and conflict. But one slant of human history is so concisely describable, and so negative, it has been neglected by historians as the driver of so much: “Destruction of life and wealth in the service of mythology.”
The victors of conflict tend toward the error of permanence, viewing shattered dreams as shattered glass. Societies driven by mythology behave more like distributed systems, carrying with incredible resilience a cultural and mythological payload. Everyone who has seen a particular Hollywood movie has received a quick introduction to distributed systems, courtesy of a former Governor of California: (YouTube) Come with me if you want to live.
The first resource of prediction is extrapolation of the current trend, which may appear to be a lull. It denies the dynamic nature of adversaries, which are in the early stages of
- post conflict assessment.
- political reorganization.
- accumulation of resources.
- revision of strategy.
- resumption of conflict.
The state actor. Iran’s attempt at empire has left it with an excess of management structure. Previously occupied with administering elements in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, only Iraq is left. One doesn’t waste that kind of talent, so it is likely to be put to work in Iraq, elevating near-term risk to that country.
Both sides of this conflict incorporate religious/mythological elements, though the proportions differ. The West, and Israel still, are reliant, post WW2, on a modern legacy of secular thought. This manifests in our astonishment of Russian casualties in Ukraine in a totally optional war. It was preceded in the Iran-Iraq war by Iran’s use of child martyrs; see Child Soldiers in Iran.
Non-state-actors. Our continual astonishment at barbarities could result in lack of consideration of the more dire modalities should this conflict resume. The actions of non-state actors seem to defy the restraint of any form of logic. The failure of the intifada will cause these actors to explore more extreme strategies, without apparent limit to self-harm.
One of our secular givens is that these terror groups are basically fighting for a life on earth. This implies that the land of Israel must be regained as a habitable place. This negates the possibility of a completely religious motivation, the land now a mere symbol of possession, regained as a completely sterile wasteland, incapable of human habitation. The reservoir is Syria; see After Assad; a Terror Nation-State.
This implies that non-state actors will attempt the use of weapons of mass destruction without regard for the populations for which they presumably advocate. The use of Gazans as human shields is an early form of this meme, which will evolve with greater virulence.
There is no off-switch:
***Come with me if you want to live.***