What follows is not predictive of how this war will turn out. Seven fallacies of press and pundits are discussed. If you are employing one or more, consider reformulating your argument.

Myth 1. The press, and various open source authorities, such as retired military, voice strong and contradictory opinions at how this war is going. The data required to inform these opinions is not available in open source. Political spin dominates. What about the war planners who have the data? Their accuracy is impaired by the chaos of war. Some time before the last battle, when things become obvious, four trends are possible:

• We’re winning, and we know it.
• We’re losing, and we know it.
• We’re winning, but we think we’re losing.
• We’re losing, but we think we’re winning.

Those who think  their predictions are so accurate as to certainly be among the first two should review their records of the Ukraine conflict.

To evaluate the military effort, the first data required are  air attack attrition rates of launchers, missiles, and drones, per day, and remaining stockpiles, including error bars. If the  data is good, it can be used to game  further options, possibly revealing a path to a positive strategic outcome.

Myth 2.  U.S. objectives can be achieved without regime change. A  popular phrase associated with U.S. objectives is “once and for all“, permanent de-nuclearization and de-missilization.

This myth results from a confusion of physical infrastructure with mental infrastructure. It is feasible to raze the industrial base of Iran; it is not  feasible to nullify Iran’s work force. Engineering is a very high status profession in Iran,  even more than in the U.S. How long would it take to build new infrastructure, considering China would sell them brand new factories on easy credit?

The answer comes from China itself. In 1972, when Nixon visited China, that country had political impediments to economic development far more severe than Iran today. It was frozen in a Maoist orthodoxy that prohibited economic development. In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping assumed power, capital accumulation was finally encouraged. In 2010,  only 32 years later, the industrial output of China passed the U.S.  But China lacked Iran’s skilled work  force, so razing Iran’s industrial and military infrastructure would buy at most a decade.

Myth 3. “Imminent threat” is the proper measure to determine the validity of U.S. deployments. When a threat becomes  imminent, it is  is often too late to prevent serious consequences.

Myth 4. The Strait of Hormuz is irreplaceable in world commerce. See New Pipelines for the Middle East; Bypassing the Strait of Hormuz . Some commentators have pointed out that other bulk commodities, such as fertilizer and petrochemicals, also transit the strait.  In the U.S. all bulk commodities other than oil, and some oil too, go by rail.  Is it difficult to build a railroad in Arabia?  Before World War I, the Turks built the 810 mile Hejaz railway on the west side of the Arabian peninsula, which ran from Damascus to Medina. A freight line  on the east side of the peninsula, along with pipelines, to Salalah in Oman, would devalue the strait.

Myth 5 (possible). A quick end to hostilities, even if Iran is left with considerable capacity to regenerate, is preferable to a drawn-out conflict. This is driven by blockage of the Strait. If the Strait is devalued, we can take our time and options open up,  with opportunity for Kissinger’s diplomacy backed by force. The longer the time frame, the more possible regime change becomes.

Myth 6. Bypassing the Strait with pipelines and freight rail is too expensive. It’s actually much cheaper than fighting a war: $10M/mile for a pipeline, $5M/mile for a single freight track. You do the math.

Myth 7. Iranians can overthrow their captors without guns. Anchors conditioned by senseless gun violence in the U.S. barely manage to sputter “and guns” at the end of their homilies.  I got over this by sheer force of logic. You can too.

(CNN) Iran building up defenses of Kharg Island to protect against potential US ground attack, sources say.

A very effective countermeasure exists.

(AP)  Trump says Iran gave the US a gift ‘worth a tremendous amount of money’.

As to what the gift is, here is a reasonable guess, with the attractiveness of reciprocity:

Iran will permit the transit through the Strait of Hormuz of oil equal in value or quantity to the 140 million barrels of Iranian oil  stranded at  sea now subject to sanctions relief. Against a background of endless negotiations, renewals will be contingent on U.S. strikes cessation, and unverifiable Iranian concessions.

Iran takes the initiative in relief of the markets, while the U.S. can only obstruct the markets. International opinion, including allies, swings sharply against the U.S. Continuation is contingent on cessation of hostilities. The result, vindicating the mullahs, is discussed in

What Are the Mullahs of Iran Thinking?

This action by  Iran  results in a return to a frozen conflict. This is the low risk option. It leaves Iran in a position to block the Strait at will.

The alternative U.S. option, preserving the original strategic objectives, involves seizure of several strategic Iranian islands. It potentially frees the Strait from Iranian threat, while exposing occupying troops to continuous, low intensity fires.

Which option would you take?

(CNN) Trump says Vance and Rubio are participating in talks with Iran to end war. In preface, my sympathies lie with General Jack Keane of ISW. Nothing in this critical appraisal should be accepted uncritically.

Quoting CNN,

The speaker of the Iranian parliament has been talked of as a potential interlocutor with the Trump administration.

CNN’s Fred Pleitgen has more on Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf…

Choice of a hard line Iranian interlocutor over a moderate or reformer may be capitulation to reality on the ground in Iran,  to domestic politics, or a combination of the two. While support for this action increased in the first weeks, the American public has no appetite for drawn-out conflict. Ghalibaf knows this, and will exploit it. Trump should expect a second Putin experience.

In fairness, the timing, before development of an insurgency,  may have been forced by more than the gathering of Khameini’s inner circle above ground. Netanyahu claims that new subterranean fortifications, invulnerable to conventional munitions, were soon to come online. I had a similar anticipation, of a switch to harder, igneous rock.

There may have been no time to develop an insurgency. A planning deficit would be more serious. Has the intelligence community lost expertise in the anticipation and foment of revolution? Quoting Why Trump is Optimistic about Iran Conflict; Role of Technology; Flexible Goals,

Set the stage for revolution, which involves getting guns to the street. As this is written, there is news that the CIA is working with the Kurds. (CNN) CIA working to arm Kurdish forces to spark uprising in Iran, sources say. Another possibility: Sistan and Baluchestan.

This suggestion, arming the street with guns, was mildly shocking to several commentators. My response: It is incongruous to offer Iranians nothing more than a quick martyrdom. Guns are a curse here in the U.S., but an unavoidable tool in the overthrow of the worst tyrannies. Mao Zedong , famous tyrant, knew this: “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun “

The contrast between excellence of military planning and poor political planning is eerily reminiscent of the “neoconservatives” of the 2003 Iraq War, when, straying far beyond Iraq, one abortive goal of that establishment was the invasion of Iran. Then, as now with their equivalents, the neoconservatives exercised their form of political orthodoxy to believe things about these countries which had no basis in reality. See What Are the Mullahs of Iran Thinking? Quoting,

Can a decapitation strike in Iran achieve the goal of regime change? The answer depends on three calculations we may not know how to make:

• • • Success of the strike, measured against the survival of the target.
    • Political implications. See Iran Protests; Is Revolution Nigh?
    • Viability of an insurgency.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf offers three illusions. The first is Ghalibaf himself; brutal and steeped in the Iranian practice of deception, which is actually codified in Shi’ism via its roots as a heretical splinter of Islam.

The second is that Ghalibaf is a unitary entity. He is not; he is embedded in a society and system. His free will is constrained by that  system.  His thoughts are cultural expressions. In Should Fox Apologize to Putin?, I wrote

After I had studied Vladimir Putin for a while, I realized that it is impossible to separate the man from the world in which he is embedded. It is an ethnocentric world of corrupt institutions and extrajudicial punishments, coexisting with a western yearning that willed the city of St. Petersburg into existence. In this milieu, there is a significant minority of completely modern people who have hybridized themselves with the west. They are just like us, a confusing veneer.

The parallels are obvious. Putin cannot turn his ship to leave Ukraine;  Ghalibaf cannot expunge Iran’s constitutional goal to eradicate Israel, or the other external goals of the IRG.

The third is that Ghalibaf can deliver. The power structure, consisting of dual elements of command and consensus  forming elements, is broken. That it has come together is a leap from sparse messaging from some elements. The absence of the command element is exemplified by a dead or comatose Supreme Leader. If there were a competent consensus-forming mechanism, this would not be allowed to persist. Both command and consensus are inoperative.  The mechanism that would delegate to Ghalibaf does not exist.

Even if Ghalibaf tries to find a new consensus, he has a motive to talk indefinitely: It keeps him off the kill list.

Two point six years million years ago to  present (2.6 MYA)

The Quaternary Present; Oil on Panel (click to enlarge))

There evolved a species so powerful, so eminent, predominant, so superlative in every way, it has the potential to change the very course of the  planet itself. But with that ownership comes great responsibility.

You break it, you own it.

See New Art Series #2; Traces of the Past; Painting the Cambrian Period; Att: Larry Gagosian.

It  would make a good movie. But in this post, we make an academic, dispassionate assessment of the hazards.

***Watch This***

The reasons for the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei connect with Shia Twelver culture in two ways.

The first is illustrated by the tearful breakdown of an Iranian news anchor:  (CNN) State TV presenter cries while announcing the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei’s first name, Ali, honors Husayn ibn Ali, the third Imam, or spiritual leader, of Shia Islam.

The tears were at least culturally lubricated by the commemorations of Ashura. Quoting Wikipedia,

By contrast, for Shia Muslims, Ashura is a day of mourning as they annually commemorate the death of Husayn ibn Ali, grandson of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and the third Shia imam.

…

The main component of ritual ceremonies (majalis, sg. majlis) is the narration of the stories of Karbala (rawza-khwani, qiraya),^[46][29][26] and the recitation of elegies and dirges (nawha, niyaha, marsia-khwani),^[47][48] all intended to raise the sympathy of audience and move them to tears.^[49]

This is on the mild side, with informal competitions among pious Iranians at who can cry the most and make their audiences cry the most. The object is to make it seem as if it happened yesterday. Others, particularly at Karbala, engage in mostly banned self flagellation and mutilation. This is why the TV anchor cried. It Indicates a level of cultural habituation that must be considered in predictions of Iranian actions.

The state religion of Iran is Twelver Shia Islam. This religion maintains that, at all times, God has a personal representative on earth.  There have been twelve so far. The first eleven were all assassinated, their fates replicated by Ali Khameini. Shi’ism incorporates elements seen in other mystic religions, blurring the lines of physical reality. The twelfth Imam, evading the fate of his predecessors, manifests in a mystic outcome. Quoting Muhammad al-Mahdi,

Hasan al-Askari, the eleventh Imam, died in AH 260 (873–874), possibly poisoned by the Abbasids. Immediately after his death, his main representative, Uthman ibn Sa’id al-Asadi, claimed that the eleventh Imam had an infant son named Muhammad, who was kept hidden from the public out of fear of Abbasid persecution. Uthman also claimed to represent Muhammad, who had entered a state of occultation.

“Occultation” means that that the twelfth Imam is here, but invisible. In a tone similar to Christian beliefs, the pious believe Muhammad will reappear at an unspecified future date. The vitality of this belief is demonstrated by the fall of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who challenged the clergy by asserting that he was in communication with the occulted Imam. This myth is actively available for popular manipulation of the image of what pious Iranians see as the next best thing  to the twelfth Imam, namely, the Supreme Leader. See Iran’s ecosystem, Part 1.

The analogies are obvious. Mojtaba Khamenei is the son of an “Ali”; all of the twelve Imams except the last have “Ali” as part of their names. Ali Khameini is a descendant of the aforementioned Imam, Husayn ibn Ali, which gives Mojtaba the blood. He isn’t too bright, but that doesn’t matter, since he is in a coma. He can’t talk, see, or hear,  which is highly compatible with occultation. Through the concept of occultation, pious Iranians are culturally habituated to a leader who is chronically invisible. And Mojtaba is bomb-proof.

This is the perfect solution for the IRG, who appear to be running the show. Mojtaba is the perfect puppet. In the near future, the miracle of AI may endow him with a new head, body, and voice. In the meantime, this tried-and-true method will work:

***Edgar Bergen and Charlie McCarthy***

As this is written, the oil storage facilities of Oman’s Salalah Port Oil Facility are ablaze. It might seem a strange moment to commend the value of Salalah as a Hormuz alternative, but we take the long view.

The military infrastructure and industrial base of Iran can be ground down to millimeters. Their weapons stockpiles can be diminished to near zero. Yet in the absence of profound political change, the tiny residuum is enough to obstruct Hormuz.

The reason is sheer geography. Mountains bordering the water, or separated by a narrow coastal plain, offer copious cover for small units with modern weapons. While formerly, massive emplacements were required, modern missile replacements are much smaller, and highly portable, even multi-man-portable, or by mules. The cover is so effective, Iran can mine the strait in the  near proximity of maximal U.S. naval forces. It is not feasible to deploy naval assets close to or in the strait because the exchange costs are extremely unfavorable.

In the coming months, with Ukrainian help for drone defense, the direct threat to the Gulf states will diminish to almost zero. The strait will remain blocked. Who capitulates first will depend on not only their immediate condition, but also the prospects of improvement. While Iran has no prospects save U.S./ Gulf capitulation, we have more options.

The solution, which by urgency is no longer long term, is massive expansion of overland pipelines, and construction of entirely new ones. Parts of the project can begin almost immediately. Ground preparation and laying of pipeline do not offer concentrated, high value targets. Pumping stations have Intermediate risk. The final steps of terminal construction and loading facilities are delayed until Iranian capabilities become minimal.

The effect of new pipelines on Iranian evolution cannot be overstated. With time on our side, and Iranian lack of means to pay their minions, their system will decay. Time will finish what precision munitions cannot touch.

How long would it take? When Germany constructed a massive LNG terminal/complex in months, one wag said the pace seemed Chinese.

Think Manhattan Project; think Chinese. Just get it done.

Edit. This may now be hypothetical. (Sun) KILLER IN A COMA Iran’s impotent new Ayatollah is in a COMA and has lost at least one leg – as his rogue regime plunges world into chaos 

Mojtaba Khamenei is the new Supreme Leader of Iran. Imagine that you have been tasked with a short essay on where he is most likely to be found. Artificially, your study cannot reference the vast targeting resources of the intelligence community. Consider:

• Legitimacy of his selection.

• Popular legitimacy.

• Credentials.

• Power base.

• Who he needs to connect with now.

• How he might seek to establish his legitimacy among those who question.

A logical answer is feasible, which may vary  based upon your individual logic.

Geography should receive mention.

Develop a contradictory, alternative argument, and choose between.

State a confidence level.

Two things, technology and diplomacy rub up against each other in this mighty foray to crack the axis of evil. Here we join them together. Kissinger said diplomacy must be backed by force, which is here rigorously satisfied. U.S. technology is being showcased on the world stage. Nevertheless, there is an element of gamble. As Clausewitz remarked, the enemy doesn’t do what you want him to do; he does what he wants to do.

Remarks appear in the press about the ineffective efforts in 1991 to eliminate Saddam Hussein’s mobile SCUD launchers. The current optimism is due to advances in sensor technology. In 1991, digital imaging was present in reconnaissance satellites, but it was primitive. Multiple exposures by low resolution sensors were stitched together by mechanical slewing of the imaging platform. A typical cellphone demonstrates far greater performance; a modern reconnaissance satellite is that much better than a cellphone.

Deployment of satellites to detect missile launches began in 1963 with the Missile Defense Alarm System, but the electromechanical MIDAS sensor could not form an image; it simply pointed in the direction of maximum brightness. This was followed by the Defense Support Program, but most of these satellites used “push-broom” sensors, While modern sensors have the shapes of rectangles, the push-broom sensor was in the shape of a line, with only one dimension. By rotating or pushing the line, a few images per minute could be acquired.

Many readers have heard of FLIR, but few know the origin.  It’s an obsolete acronym for a rectangular sensor, like the one in a cellphone,  that doesn’t need to be physically pushed around to form an image. All modern sensors are “FLIR”; these are used in the current Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellite constellation. SBIRS was developed partly in response to 1991 Iraq, when SCUD launchers successfully hid in the almost featureless western desert.

For the first time, the high availability and precise real time image forming ability of SBIRS permits use of satellites to counter tactical threats, such as finding launchers. complimented by the Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk, the F35’s AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System (DAS) IR sensors, the U-2, and similar platforms.

But space-based assets are only part of the launcher kill-chain, followed by ground-based processing.  Computational photography renders details invisible to the human eye-brain system, merging into AI classification, with details useful to the running tally.  With only minutes before a launcher vanishes, the next step is to compute the response. What assets, with what strike packages, are available to satisfy the cost functional? Drone, loitering munition, “bomb truck”, F-35?

This is a global optimization problem, related to  the “traveling salesman problem”.  In 1985, Hopfield and Tank solved it “near-optimally” with a neural network, reviving AI from its first winter. The answer comes in a few seconds, because the AI knows the status of every available weapon.

Launchers are being eliminated more rapidly than anticipated. There is no precedent for this; hence the results may be unprecedented, coming a little bit closer to boots on the ground. But the bases are a distinct issue; an undefined percentage of Iran’s rocket bases may be under granite rock, beyond the reach of even the MOP. Even with the mixed sedimentary-metamorphic stratigraphy of Fordow, multiple MOPs were applied in multiple hits to “drill down” existing ventilation shafts. Access to these bases is via adits, a.k.a. horizontal tunnels. Tens of yards of these can be collapsed, but the damage is repairable, compared to Fordow, which undermined the mountain itself. And the terrain outside an adit can be altered to impede guidance of a munition to the most vulnerable point of impact.

Hence a purely kinetic solution to Iran’s missile bases may not be possible.  A trade may be envisioned. Destruction of Iran’s industrial base is feasible. At some point, the surviving power structure may be amenable to sacrificing the bases in exchange for remaining infrastructure. This assumes some minimal commonality of values. Sometimes there is, sometimes not. North Vietnam is most pertinent. This ingenious culture valued infrastructure, yet was completely willing to sacrifice it for a political goal. The self-destructive Taliban are even more extreme.

Confounding the comparison is the complete split of Iran between pro-West and theocratic elements. If the theocracy capitulates, they may not survive in a new Iran. The fluidity, and the multiple branches of different futures suggest:

• Multiple U.S. strategies are in play. Rather than define the goal at the outset it is legitimate to allow the goal develop over time.
• Destroy industrial base until or unless an opportunity for a trade for the bases manifests. Thorough destruction of these bases requires either Iran’s accession to boots-on-the ground demolition teams, or radical political change.
• Set the stage for revolution, which involves getting guns to the street. As this is written, there is news that the CIA is working with the Kurds. (CNN) CIA working to arm Kurdish forces to spark uprising in Iran, sources say. Another possibility: Sistan and Baluchestan.
• Although the periphery presents opportunities for pressure by destabilization, a core Persian insurgency would greatly favor a good outcome. It is also hardest to achieve.
• Temporary chaos should not be feared. It is an opportunity.

Opinion variously judges Trump’s gamble by international law, human rights advocacy, risk, exit strategy, and domestic politics. None of these frameworks are adequate for the question. Ultimately, it will be judged by results, and later, by history.