(CNN) Trump agrees to two-week ceasefire with Iran.

Open source often must rely on after-the-fact deduction. Quoting from Iran Conflict Myths; Seven Fallacies,

Myth 1. The press, and various open source authorities, such as retired military, voice strong and contradictory opinions at how this war is going. The data required to inform these opinions is not available in open source. Political spin dominates. What about the war planners who have the data? Their accuracy is impaired by the chaos of war. Some time before the last battle, when things become obvious, four trends are possible:

• • • • We’re winning, and we know it.
      • We’re losing, and we know it.
      • We’re winning, but we think we’re losing.
      • We’re losing, but we think we’re winning.

One possibility was left out, the current situation of strategic deadlock. Both parties can sustain the conflict almost indefinitely.

In this swirl the foremost question was, could the U.S. open the Strait of Hormuz? In the past few weeks, this has become the missing demonstration of U.S. power, a requirement rather than an option. If it were possible, the destruction of Iran’s electrical grid would not have been made the substitute. Execution would deprive the U.S. of even the most tenuous support of allies, with additional restrictions on the use of bases, and preeminently, loss of congressional support.

This is the way open source intel works. We cannot directly evaluate the feasibility of war plans, seen or unseen. We know that in the 1990’s  when Iran had lined the shore with ponderous Chinese Silkworm missiles. there were plans to dig them out, with an estimated time for the task of two weeks. The Strait was still approachable by naval vessels, which could competently deal with the Silkworm. Since that time, faster, smaller, more accurate missiles require much greater separation. A single Iranian missile is not guaranteed a hit; the math of repetition works against a navy.

So we can now infer that in at least one way, Iran has the upper hand. We can also infer something about the broad strategy. It was thought that air strikes would degrade Iran’s war-making capacity to insignificance, rendering Iran incapable of concentrating forces along the coast of Hormuz. This may have been partly successful, but the problem of concentrated missile fire at compact area, such as a small island, remains. The 1-2 ton warhead of an Iranian ballistic missile can demolish any field bunker Marines might build.

What options does Trump have? Choices of abandonment or modification remain open. 

• It has been suggested that he could declare victory and disengage. This is a hard sell.
• He could switch to a  low intensity approach.
• He could hold Iranian tankers  hostage in an ocean corral off Oman and sell their oil, using the revenue as a carrot.
• There are ways to disable a power grid which are more easily repairable than destroying power plants.
• He could promote an insurgency, the absence of which is the greatest flaw of the plan.

While POTUS cannot completely duck this situation, he cannot be expected to understand military plans in detail.  His judgement depends on really smart, well balanced administrators, devoid of strange beliefs and agendas. Military science, in combination with intelligence and diplomacy, informs us of what is possible, what is desirable, and what is avoidable.

To POTUS: Changes must be made. You probably know what you have to do and who to do it to.

***How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying***

See Iran’s Next Move? The SAM Trap.

(CNN) Smerconish: Now that we’re in Iran, we cannot afford a premature exit. Subtitle: Smerconish examines the current state of the war with Iran, and the necessity of securing the Islamic Republic’s enriched uranium.

Examining the inconsistent ways the Administration has expressed goals of U.S. action, Smerconish settles on the conceptually simplest one: seize a hard, dense metal, enriched uranium, that facilitates  great harm. If only this could substitute for the messy business of upending a regime of terror by men with guns and replacing it with a nice bunch of people with no guns!

Quoting Iran Conflict Myths; Seven Fallacies,

Myth 2.  U.S. objectives can be achieved without regime change. A  popular phrase associated with U.S. objectives is “once and for all“, permanent de-nuclearization and de-missilization.

This myth results from a confusion of physical infrastructure with mental infrastructure. It is feasible to raze the industrial base of Iran; it is not  feasible to nullify Iran’s work force. Engineering is a very high status profession in Iran,  even more than in the U.S. How long would it take to build new infrastructure, considering China would sell them brand new factories on easy credit?…razing Iran’s industrial and military infrastructure would buy at most a decade.

Smerconish does not specify whether the uranium stockpile is to be surrendered or seized. The first assumes something about the IRG that may not be true. Quoting Why Trump is Optimistic about Iran Conflict; Role of Technology; Flexible Goals, substitute uranium for bases:

Hence a purely kinetic solution to Iran’s missile bases may not be possible.  A trade may be envisioned. Destruction of Iran’s industrial base is feasible. At some point, the surviving power structure may be amenable to sacrificing the bases in exchange for remaining infrastructure. This assumes some minimal commonality of values. Sometimes there is, sometimes not. North Vietnam is most pertinent. This ingenious culture valued infrastructure, yet was completely willing to sacrifice it for a political goal. The self-destructive Taliban are even more extreme.

So what if they won’t give it up? Then we have to go in and get it. That would require transporting hundreds or thousands of troops through airspace that has recently proven unsafe. It also requires that the Iranians are dumb. The IRG is not full of brilliant minds, but it take little to imagine a booby-trapped fortress, where thousands of tons of rock comes crashing down on Special Forces. The uranium can be dug out at the Iranians’ leisure. For a dramatization, see Could U.S. Special Forces Seize Iran’s Enriched Uranium from Secret Cave?

Suppose we take the uranium. Is that the end of the question? No; the IRG would prefer to make the Bomb themselves, but that is largely a matter of pride. North Korean nukes are vastly more sophisticated, much more powerful, smaller, and, I daresay, for sale at  the right price.

We are left with the only true  defense  against nuclear proliferation, Nice People.

This argument between Michael Smerconish in the Philly Burbs and Bob Morein in the Philly Burbs may be a subject matter first for the Philly Burbs. How about them Eagles?