Before schemes for deescalation can be mooted, these questions demand examination:

A statement attributed to Israel is that they thought Hezbollah discovered  the pager bombs, implying that the timing of the pager explosions was not planned, but forced.

• Did this force an escalation that was not planned for this particular moment?
• If forced, is the timing slightly off, or badly off?

If the timing was not forced, or not severely off, is Israeli strategy:

• Irrational, driven by rage, combined with a desire for “once-and-for all” permanence.
• Semi-rational, with a not well calculated plan to vitiate an enemy that tends to regenerate.
• Calculated, a precise strategy that could produce a shift with mid-term durability.

If the timing was forced, what is the viability of an unplanned operational goal?

Unlike the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, when the Christian Maronites had only recently lost political dominance, political change is not a realistic goal. What is?

Hezbollah  is believed  to have significant underground infrastructure, and a huge stock of missiles. By stressing Hezbollah,  with new advances in surveillance technology, Israel may hope to map infrastructure and destroy it.

If this is the goal, it will proceed to a culmination that

• lacks political benefit.
• results in a mid-term durable change  in military security.

Military security, paramount in Israeli eyes, is endangered by Hezbollah’s huge rocket hoard, particularly if fired at a high rate in an organized fashion. Relief from this cannot come from diplomacy. As with Ukraine ceasefire, deescalation would offer Hezbollah the opportunity to regroup.

Conclusion. If Israel’s strategy is less than rational, diplomacy has a chance. If it is rational, it will proceed against diplomatic pressure, until the infrastructure is destroyed.