(BBC) Putin warns West that Russia is ready to use every weapon to protect Kaliningrad.
In Ratcliffe’s trip to Moscow, I wrote,
My inclination is that Ratcliffe’s trip concerned the Suwałki Gap. That chip is big enough to matter.
But given the lack of strategic intelligence relating to the Gap, I was unable to pin the article on the likelihood of it as the target.
Consensus seems to favor a Russian plan, the subject of Ratcliffe’s visit, as a pinprick, a minor provocation, enough to trigger Article 5, without absolutely necessitating NATO mobilization. By implication, the Russian intent is to weaken Article 5 by habituating NATO to weak response. In line with the idea of a limited provocation, the UK et al are training to repel “little green men” should they appear in the Faroe Islands or Svalbard.
In the category of major provocations, Lithuania leads. With a large Russian population with strong Russian sympathies. Pan-Russian unification, which served as a Ukraine invasion pretext, directly applies.
There is a tendency among the pundits to self-edit discussion of actions of shocking scope, such as potential use of WMDs. That WMDs have not been used may have been due to the Russian realization that certain installations in Russia, which are feasible targets for Ukraine’s new missiles, would, if destroyed, have the same impact on Russia as WMDs.
What of Gap itself as a provocation? The Suwałki Gap is too big a bite for punditry, too likely to trigger a full Article 5 response to be popular. Without closely guarded HUMINT, this remains a game of weights and measures. But Putin’s statement adds weight to an attack on the Gap. His statement is precisely analogous to the pretext that was planned and attempted but failed with Ukraine: an incursion on Russian territory.
A counter-argument. Kalingrad has been stripped bare of military assets, except for nuclear tipped missiles. Russia lacks manpower; what is available is committed to Ukraine.
Yet this was the predicament of Ukraine, when, on August 6, 2024, they launched an offensive into the Kursk region of Russia. A successful diversionary attack forces the enemy to divert more resources to defense than the attacker employs in offense.
Could Russia take and hold the Gap? The Russian invasion of Ukraine has, in a few short years, revolutionized warfare. For now, Ukraine has the lead over Russia, with technology and training freely available to the West. But while hitherto, a new weapon required only intensive training on that weapon, drones have changed war-fighting at the core.
The U.S. Army maintains eight centers of excellence, responsible for doctrine and training. Drone warfare intersects at least four of these, requiring a scope of integration far beyond the organizational table. Clearly, this requires a ninth, integrative center of excellence. The consumer is the NCO corps, who are responsible for keeping their soldiers alive on the battlefield. Without, U.S. forces, despite overwhelming firepower, cannot be considered a symmetric peer on the modern battlefield. The same dilemma confronts other NATO members.
With Western doctrinal deficiencies, there is another way to learn. Traditionally, before modern training, units were trained and hardened in combat by watching their buddies die. This combat hardening was called “blooding.” This is how Ukrainians and Russians learned. Training is to be preferred.
Russian meat-wave tactics, enabled by Russian culture, have no direct counter in the West. These complement Russian drones. With the advantage of doctrines with which the West has no direct experience, Russia might successfully seize and hold the Gap.The current state of NATO readiness makes it possible. The balance of outcome depends upon both Western deficiencies of doctrine, and what anticipation may have done for preparation.
One incalculable factor: Never underestimate the desperation of a dying dictator.
