(CNN) Earth’s inner core may have stopped turning and could go into reverse, study suggests.

This is baloney. The cited study, Multidecadal variation of the Earth’s inner-core rotation, claims no such thing. Quoting from the abstract,

Differential rotation of Earth’s inner core relative to the mantle is thought to occur under the effects of the geodynamo on core dynamics and gravitational core–mantle coupling.

The word in red is omitted. CNN, you could have used “relative.”

The difference in the speeds of rotation of the inner  core and the mantle, regardless of direction, is about that of a near-frozen inchworm. If you were looking at it, you would see nothing.

How much must be lost in translation?

Combined arms is an ancient concept. In this context, it refers to the presumed ability of infantry which accompany tanks to protect them from man-portable antitank weapons. This was feasible when man-portable antitank weapons were unguided and extremely limited in effective range  – 50% hit —  of no more than a few hundred meters. Working in concert with the tank,  an exclusion zone  keeps these weapons out of range.

Although (pdf) Mathematical Analysis of the Counterfire Duel: Tanks vs. Anti-Tank Munitions is specific to the M712 Copperhead, it is representative of smart munitions in general:

Abstract-A detailed, analytic model is developed to represent the duel between a ground laser designator (GLD) directing a sequence of laser-guided rounds against a platoon of target tanks which counterfire against the GLD. The model accurately portrays the complex interplay between the designator-on time, the rate of fire of the laser-guided rounds, and the tank counterfire response time distributions. Also taken into account are the tank aiming errors and range estimating techniques. the level of GLD protection, flight times, designation modes, and degree of coordination of the tank platoon.

Before the advent of a whole class of precision weapons with strong analogy to the above, it took bravery to confront a tank at close range. The need for bravery has been reduced to a level less akin  to immediate self sacrifice.

Skip to page 40, figure 13. Quoting,

The graph shows the expected number of tanks killed (solid curves) and the probability of GLD kill (dashed curves) in a 3-on-3 encounter over a range of tank-to-GLD distances,with the GLD located in either a foxhole, a Forward Observer Vehicle or a bunker.

The greater the distance from the GLD to the target, the more kills achieved by the GLD before it is destroyed. This is the opposite of unguided man-portable antitank weapons.  The required exclusion buffer around the tank expands to 800 meters for the NLAW, 4000 meters  for the FGM-148 Javelin, and 8000 meters for the 9M133 Kornet. It is not possible for  infantry to exclude these weapons from large areas that they do not yet control.

Penetration of Russian tank armor often results in ammo cook-offs resulting in the jack-in-the-box  blown off turrets. Tank proponents vaunt the superior armor and ammunition storage of current western main battle  tanks, which do not so dramatically destruct. Sadly, drama is not required. A hit from a top attack weapon has a high chance of penetration, almost inevitably causing multiple crew casualties, disabling  the tank.

While the Abrams and Leopard 2 have clear advantage over Russian tanks in frontal engagement, this does not imply greater resistance against top-attack weapons, or from attack from the sides or rear with shaped charges or explosively formed penetrators. While crew are more likely to survive a penetration, the result is 60-70 tons of metal transformed into spare parts and scrap.

The Marines have turned in their tanks, mandated by their new littoral mission. A general principle can be distilled: Stealth multiplies lethality. Is it impossible to employ armored spearheads in Ukraine? If the abysmal performance of the Russian army continues, it is conceivable, though such assumption receives warning from von Clausewitz. Paraphrasing, the  enemy does not do what you want him to do; he does what he wants to do, which could be competence with the 9M133 Kornet.  Cluster munitions would be far more useful to Ukraine.

This is a plausibility argument, not contradicted by recent battle experience. We guessed this war all wrong, which does not hinder tank proponents, yet should give pause. The tentative conclusion is that the current battle doctrine of combined infantry-armor requires either re-validation or revision.

For those readers who desire a short summation of this complicated discussion, here it is:

***Tanks are NFG***

Popular speculation on Surovikin’s demotion centers on his “alliance” with Prigozhin, implying conflict with the Russian M.O.D., which is presumably alleviated by the appointment of Gerasimov as the new theater commander.

If Putin’s former reputation as a coldly logical thinker were not diminished, this reasoning would not be so attractive. The explanation for why some actor did something always exists on multiple planes:

• Stated reason, with at least partly fallacious logic.
• Private, how the actor understands his motivation at the level of consciousness.
• The real reason, a product of the unconscious mind, unknown to the actor himself.

The popular argument cannot be excluded from the mix. But it lacks logical support, hiding the lack in the swirl of frictions that envelope the Kremlin. A simple syllogism kicks kicks it hard:

• Premise: Putin’s overriding goal is to win his war.
• If Surovikin were winning, his replacement would compromise the overriding goal.
• Therefore, his  replacement is primarily due to military failure.

This logic has been neglected. Within the desert of Russian military strategy, bolstered by a romantic belief in Russian military qualities, Putin has engaged in a quixotic search for the perfect general. In the 18th Century, there was a Russian candidate for perfection. Alexander Suvorov never lost a battle. His admirable personal qualities and modest lifestyle contrast with the degraded modern Russian military. Perhaps the last who could approach him was Zhukov.

As Putin’s romantic dream wilted, he gained a new appreciation for industrial warfare. This is key to the selection of Gerasimov. Russia’s military-industrial complex is small, with a “stovepipe” informational architecture lacking lateral connections. While the U.S. complex has widespread lateral contact with the uniform military, this is not true in Russia.

Surovikin’s appointment in 2017 as Commander of the Aerospace Forces does not negate this.  He is a field officer, without technical background or the advanced education of western militaries. It implies an institutional system that promotes field combat experience as a qualification for any position, no matter how technical. The Russian romantic replaces expertise with martial experience when substitution is actually impossible.

Gerasimov is marginally better. His long experience as a staff officer brings him close to the tops of the stovepipes, where he can sample the smoke. He has contact with suppliers. He may even be able to read parts of a contract. He knows who is stealing, a step in the right direction.  He can see the supply chain in action. Gerasimov is the best Russia has to enable industrial warfare for Putin’s “long war.”

Let’s revisit the Kremlin Game of Thrones. Prigozhin’s public persona resembles a cobble of Navalny (alleging corruption) and the bellicosity of some separatist leaders who were liquidated by the Kremlin. As his public posture gets louder while Putin’s voice softens, why is Prigozhin still alive? The answer is the  premise of the syllogism: Putin’s overriding goal is to win his war.

Prigozhin is in conflict with the Conglomerate Imperative: Grow by absorption. The M.O.D. wants to own Wagner. This does not mean an immediate acquisition; absorption could result in the loss of Wagner’s edge.  But Putin’s clock is running; see Putin Disappears; Illness a Factor? Prigozhin risks a  prolonged, violent succession struggle. Surovikin’s alliance figures as a minor footnote.

Stalin: “Death solves all problems, no man, no problem.”

(Click to enlarge)

Firebird, or Phoenix, as you prefer. The Firebird brings bad luck to those who try to catch it.  The Phoenix is reborn from the ashes of the fire.

Digital, Artrage.

Dedicated to the brave people of Ukraine.

We’re not predicting. It is possible to give some shape to the future. The mainstream media studiously ignores the chemo tracks on Putin’s hand, and other obvious medical issues. These are key to 2023, far more deterministic in effect than anything else, save the Ukrainian ability to fruitfully stymie the Russian military. See  Putin Disappears; Illness a Factor?

Here in the U.S., we’ve had recent exposure to the authoritarian mindset, of both the leader and the follower. This is a quasi-personal relationship. When the leader  suffers political eclipse, his loyalties are not transferable. The obedient masses become the querulous masses.

So it is in Russia. Putin’s  popularity results from deep authoritarian tradition. Stalin said, “What can I do? The people want a czar.” When Stalin died, executions followed, not on the scale of the purges, but as a political part of the succession process. We see this now, an accelerated rate of extrajudicial executions, as hardliners attempt to “shape the battlefield” for the succession struggle.

The hardliners authored Putin’s expansionist ideology; he didn’t do it himself. He represents both an asset and a hindrance:

• Putin is the irreplaceable conduit to the masses.
• Compared to some of the hardliners, such as Aleksandr Dugin, who espouse out-and-out extermination of Ukrainians, Putin is a moderate.

Thus far, the logic is  a clockwork. Now we come to the first question:

• As  Putin weakens, will he acquiesce to the hardliners, removing the tension?
• When physical, and possibly mental incompetence becomes manifest, will the hardliners visibly depose Putin?
• Valuing his conduit,  will they keep him as a figurehead as long as he can be made presentable?

The clockwork resumes; the murky interregnum is followed by Putin’s absolute disappearance. His legacy becomes subject to interpretation and appropriation. In life there have been at least three Putins:

• Creator of wealth and provider of welfare.
• Author of a  nationalist cultural ethos orbiting the dark double stars of Spartan militarism and religion. See Russia, the new Sparta; Putin, Lycurgus & Oswald Spengler.
• Warmonger and destroyer of wealth.

The factions that emerge will be free to edit Putin’s image. The universal question will be “How did we become so poor?” The hardliners will be blamed for massive destruction of wealth. And they will have no good answer, because they don’t know how to run a country. Many of those who do have already fled Russia.

Pretenders to the throne will have a hard time acquiring legitimacy from Russians who miss their czar.  In other countries, the military have often stepped in. In Russia, there are few visible candidates untainted by debacle. Surovikin is a possible exception. Prigozhin is an alleged ally, which may be a highly temporary arrangement. Or, as suggested in Power Transition in Russia? Revolution? Part 1, colonels could revolt. See also Power Transition in Russia? Revolution? Part 2.

The effect on the Russian military will be profound. In the event of an unseemly succession of Prigozhin, some officers may recant their oaths. The military may in fact crumble. The blood lust between factions, with practiced lethality, will be huge. In this environment, it is natural for Russians, cultural heirs to the Purges, for the sake of survival, to mask their thoughts.

Will a “Party of Wealth” vanquish the “War Faction”, so adroit at political murder? This cannot be assured in the first round. But Russia will always have the capacity for rebirth as a civilized nation, as celebrated by  Igor Stravinsky.

***Firebird Suite***

(CNN) Head of major Russian shipyard dies suddenly, no cause given.

Espionage/execution is likely. There is significant possibility he sold the noise signatures of the improved Kilo class submarine.

More later.

At the height of World War II, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, sailed across the Atlantic, hazarding U-boats, to address Congress on January 8, 1942:

Winston Churchill Addresses Congress

Thank you Zelenskyy, for reminding us of the price of freedom. Today, we are all Ukrainian.

(Wapo) No conclusive evidence Russia is behind Nord Stream attack.

Russia did not do this. They own Nordstream, and are the only ones who can put gas into it, or make money from it. They would sabotage adversary assets. See (9/28) Who Sabotaged Nordstream Pipelines?

The popular misattribution results from the intrusion of the habit of  the political “blame game” into the sphere of security. It’s a bad habit that could be costly in  the future. There are enough reasons to hate Russia without it.

Were the perpetrators found, they would deserve medals. They likely will not be.

All watched over by machines of loving grace.

…Richard Brautigan

In the days of the Soviet Union, the opacity of the Kremlin gave rise to the specialty of Kremlinology. The tools of the trade were politics and personality. The health of the subjects was addressed in the most general terms.

The new Kremlin affords more access to all but the most guarded sanctums. Yet Kremlinologists ply their old trade, taking advantage of only part of the new cornucopia. One obstacle remains;  Kremlin players now wear masks of concealment. Simon Sebag Montefiore’s book,  Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, quotes Beria at the death couch of Stalin. “Comrades, I have saved us all!” anticipates scenes of what may soon occur.

On May 30, I wrote Is Putin Seriously Ill? Then regarded as almost baseless speculation, his illness has gradually migrated towards respectable opinion. On July 25, Parkinson’s disease or Parkinsonism was identified as possible in CIA Bill Burns (Putin) & CNN (NY Polio).  Since then, visible motor problems are indicative of actual Parkinson’s disease.

Yet this has little play among Kremlinologists and the media. Among  practitioners, illness is something that happens to you. When it does, you consign your fate to physicians. Among physicians, it is strongly taboo to diagnose without seeing the patient and ordering standard-of-care tests. This results in severe bias of exclusion among historians, and their contemporary counterparts, analysts.  Ebola, Rats, Lice, and History, and Hans Zinsser Part 1, provides a capsule of Zinsser’s thought:

Historians seem to keep within the perspectives of personal comfort; no successors have taken Zinsser’s mantle. Disease is merely noted as coincident with events political and economic, when more than occasionally, it has been the prime driver. Disease has driven civilizations into decline, and exterminated primitive populations.

In a YouTube video, a British analyst, noting that Putin recently drove the Kerch bridge, pronounced his health adequate for the annual year-end media events. Having disposed of health, he offers conventionally political reasons for his disappearance, reprising the error of historians. His medical judgement is wrong. He should have found an oncologist willing to give an anonymous opinion.

The media bias replicates the above, with an addition. Juridical circumspection is a linchpin  of a respectable free press. It is misapplied here. Putin is not protected by HIPAA, due process,  right to privacy, or presumption of innocence. He is the valid subject of the almost-facts that dominate intelligence work. Here’s one: Putin is dying. This estimate is based entirely on public video.

What is he dying of? The tabloid press is full of contradictions. It is impossible to extend the estimate based on contradictory purported diagnoses. One new symptom, coughing, suggests wide metastasis of whatever it is. Metastasis to the tissues surrounding the lungs frequently results in malignant pleural effusion.

During his disappearance, Putin may receive a variety of treatments, some temporarily disabling, advisable only for a ruler for whom there is no alternative:

• If  the tumor is in fact solid, in contrast to a blood cancer, repeated laparoscopic surgery to debulk and remove obstructions.
• Pleural aspiration.
• Intensive chemotherapy.
• External beam radiotherapy.
• Radioactive implants.
• Nerve blocks.
• Coley’s toxins.

Unlike infectious disease, every cancer is unique, the result of the myriad forms of genetic damage, unique to the individual.  The cough, if confirmed, collapses the timeline. Previously, the WAG was 3 years. Now, 6 months.

The Kremlin players, with masks of concealment, have a difficult choice, to watch and wait, or hasten. They are not friends; they are rivals.  When they drop their masks, they may be unrecognizable. Who strikes first has the best chance of neutralizing the others, but at a price.

What price legitimacy?