(Edit, to reflect that Antony Blinken was not a career state department officer. Lawrence Eagleburger was the only career officer to become Secretary of State.) (Wapo) Documents reveal U.S. military’s frustration with White House, diplomats over Afghanistan evacuation. Quoting, Military personnel would have been “much better prepared to conduct a more orderly” evacuation, Navy Rear … Continue reading Afghanistan Evacuation; U.S. Army Probe; (CNN) Jake Tapper on Biden’s Dismissal →

The weakness of the idea is disguised by the ability of the U.S. military to do more with less soldiers than any other force. But there are limits. Perhaps it would have been possible, with  round-the-clock support from B-52 delivered JDAM guided munitions, to maintain one huge firebase. The French Dien Bien Phu was such … Continue reading Leave 2500 troops in Afghanistan? →

(CNN) Top US commanders in Afghanistan wrestle with mistakes and regrets as America’s longest war ends. The discussion is a tribute to the self-critical powers of the U.S. military.  The criticisms have distinct categories: Combat. Failure to provision  adequate helicopters; provisioning the Afghans primarily with Humvees, highly vulnerable to IEDs, instead of the far more … Continue reading (CNN) Top US commanders in Afghanistan wrestle with mistakes and regrets as America’s longest war ends →

From (August 2017) Trump Wants to Fire U.S. Commander in Afghanistan, The bare-bones boiled-down essence of modern government is just a few things: Raise revenue by taxation. Use at least some of the taxes to provide services. Facilitate commerce. The services provided justify the taxes enough for popular acquiescence. You can add all the bells … Continue reading Afghanistan Collapse →

The argument for leaving is laid out in Trump Wants to Fire U.S. Commander in Afghanistan, in which I explained that the unsolvable part of the Afghan problem is civil, not military. Quoting, The bare-bones boiled-down essence of modern government is just a few things: Raise revenue by taxation. Use at least some of the … Continue reading Biden: Leaving Afghanistan →

We continue from Russian Bounty on U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan; Unit 29155, Part 2. In deference to readers in the Russian government, this is not a judgment of  their domestic policies. But Russian foreign policies are malign to the West, with no better justification than Richelieu. In the West there seems to be increasing understanding … Continue reading Russian Bounty on U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan; Unit 29155, Part 3 →

We continue from Russian Bounty on U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan; Unit 29155, Part 1. The Stasi  archives that pertain to the 1986 West Berlin discotheque bombing reveal that the participants were known to the Stasi, and one, Musbah Abdulghasem Eter, was a Stasi agent. The most provocative open source comes from (AP) Report: East Germany … Continue reading Russian Bounty on U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan; Unit 29155, Part 2 →

Note: for the sake of clarity, traditional Soviet acronyms, such as KGB and GRU, are used. The name changes were frequent and of little consequence. If this  were any other decade, and but for (NY Times) Suspicions of Russian Bounties Were Bolstered by Data on Financial Transfers, I would be skeptical. The other open source … Continue reading Russian Bounty on U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan; Unit 29155, Part 1 →

Afghanistan, Iran, Yemen, and Syria, the unwanted leftovers of Western colonialism, are  situations of intractable engagement with U.S. forces. . Contrary to the Western powers that abandoned their empires, we’re stuck. A relatively new factor, Islamic terrorism, prohibits the summary exits forced on the UK, Netherlands, France, and Belgium. (MT) Trump calls off secret Camp … Continue reading The Intractables: Afghanistan, Iran, Yemen, Syria →

I wrote this on July 30, 2018. For some reason, I never hit the “publish” button. It seems fresh as a daisy, so here it is: (Reuters) ‘Very positive signals’ after U.S., Taliban talks: sources. Part of this blog is about the skill of prediction, which deeply involves recognizing previous situations that analogize with the … Continue reading Afghanistan Signals; Reflections on U.S. Policy →