The SSC-8 is probably similar to modern U.S. cruise missiles, with the ability for redeployment while in flight. It is entirely different from the Iskander, which is a ballistic missile with some terminal guidance capability.

The Russians claim  the missile is necessary for a parity-in-kind with Asian nations that possess similar missiles, notably China.  This actually has some merit. But it has a  particular use with Germany: to create domestic stress  in similar to that which occurred with the deployment of the Pershing II. Quoting from the accurate Wikipedia article, which I have redacted with ellipses (go read the article):

“Protests against the short-range MGM-52 Lance nuclear missile began in July 1981… In 1983, protesters went to court to stop the Pershing II deployment as a violation of Article 26(1) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, …Again in Bonn in October 1983, as many as 500,000 people protested the deployment and a human chain was formed…”

But, you might say, the SSC-8 is a Russian missile, while the Pershing was American. To Germans, they evoke a common fear: Germany, a compact nation, in the bulls eye of conflict. The shape of war in Germany is an old fear, dating to the founding  of NATO. It is the idea that a war would not be fought on Germany’s borders. It would, the Russian missiles emphasize, be total, involving all of German territory at once.

The Russian claim of an Asian purpose does not grant them innocence of the European. One unit has been deployed to central Asia, while the other remains near Volgograd, within range of Germany. One of Henry Kissinger’s predictions, in Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (2002), was that Germany would drift towards the east. The Russians may hope that, with modern techniques of subversion, fake news, covert funding, etc., and less than solid commitment by the U.S. to NATO, they might pry Germany in that direction. And with Germany, the Baltic states would break off like brittle bone.

The technical details of the missile are unremarkable. But the payoff to Russia is worth breaking the INF treaty.  The Russians may have a reasonable desire for parity with China.  But the  range of the Volgograd deployment says to Germany, “Here’s looking at you, kid.”

But not with love.

(Reuters) Trump knew for weeks that aide was being misleading over Russia: White House contains the assertion, by an unknown official:

“A U.S. official familiar with the transcripts of the calls with the ambassador said Flynn indicated that if Russia did not retaliate in kind for Obama’s Dec. 29 order expelling 35 Russian suspected spies and sanctioning Russian spy agencies, that could smooth the way toward a broader discussion of improving U.S.-Russian relations once Trump took power.”

As Trump remarked via Twitter, Flynn was apparently successful. From (Reuters) Trump adviser had five calls with Russian envoy on day of sanctions: sources,

“But on Dec. 30, Putin announced that he would not retaliate. Trump praised Putin for the decision, writing in a Twitter post, “Great move on delay (by V.Putin). I always knew he was very smart!”

 Were five phone calls required to say what the unnamed official states the transcripts contain? From (Washington Post) National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian ambassador, despite denials, officials say,

National security adviser Michael Flynn privately discussed U.S. sanctions against Russia with that country’s ambassador to the United States during the month before President Trump took office, contrary to public assertions by Trump officials, current and former U.S. officials said.

So there are two separate, non overlapping accounts of the substance of Flynn’s conversations.

After my August post, CIA Chief: Trump “Unwitting agent of the Russian Federation”, I did not revisit the issue of the title. To do so risks diversion from analysis to politics, which is characterized by deliberate tendentiousness and subjectivity. But turning a blind eye is also a kind of statement. These are the  questions:

• There is suspicion that Trump has a hidden agenda with Russia.
• His personal, authoritarian style, salted with “alternative facts”, does not help dispel this.
• During the election, (Slate) independent researchers detected web traffic between a Russian bank and Trump Tower of an unknown nature.  No conclusions have been reached by the FBI. But  investigations seem to be ramping up. (Bloomberg) U.S. Spy Agencies, FBI Probing Trump Team’s Russia Calls, Officials Say.

If it were not for the presence of the above, the Flynn Affair would be over as quick as you can say, “You’re fired!”

There has been resistance, in U.S. society as a whole, to the idea that Russia, beginning with RT and Anna Chapman, has recreated the modern equivalent of the KGB, and  Comintern (comparison because of the activity in media), with the U.S. as a target.  In Reuters Opinion: Did Russia Hack the Clinton emails?, I critiqued an article, Commentary: Don’t be so sure Russia hacked the Clinton emails, that seems manifestly nonsensical now.

Why are the Russians putting so much effort into this? They don’t have an ideology to sell. It’s one more non-conventional military weapon, to augment what they see as their unending battle with the West. In the Iran-Iraq war, Iran used suicide bombers, not as any kind of religious statement, but as a practical device.

It may have been nothing more than Trump’s naivete with respect to foreign affairs, or an inherent bias toward economic activity over the attitudes widely held since the start of the Cold War. (For a mercantile theory, see 2017 Predictions; Trump’s U.S./Russia Codominium/ New-New World Order). Perhaps he is inspired by the example of Armand Hammer, a distinguished American businessman and friend of Russia. Ironically, it was more acceptable to be a friend of an unconditional adversary than an ambiguous one like Putin’s Russia.

Nevertheless, it is a reminder of the joint responsibility of Congress to preserve the Republic.

If you’re an absolutist, Flynn’s phone calls are inexcusable. If you’re a relativist, it depends upon whether Flynn acted against Trump’s agenda, or in support of it. But that doesn’t untie the knot in the stomach, because most of us don’t want Trump’s agenda to be cozy reconciliation with Russia.

If you’re a digger, here’s an interesting thing to dig up:

Within the past 50 years, in the U.S.,

something like this has happened before.

It was not a complete secret at the time.

When?

The U.S. is currently in the midst of a political crisis that promises years of discord. In the midst of our domestic tumult, the rest of the world seems less important. I share this feeling.

As much as possible, this blog distinguishes itself by subject matter (focus) and approach to it. The reader has a right to expect this will be maintained. Michael Flynn was a borderline exception, a domestic official whose job related to international affairs.

The focus of this blog will continue to encompass the figures of the Trump administration as they relate to international affairs.

(Reuters) “Trump national security adviser Flynn resigns in controversy over Russian contacts”

This was preceded by (Reuters) “Justice Department warned Trump on Flynn: official” Quoting,

The Justice Department warned the White House weeks ago that national security adviser Michael Flynn could be vulnerable to blackmail for contacts with Russian officials before President Donald Trump took power, a U.S. official said on Monday.

Michael Flynn’s phone calls with the Russian Ambassador  floats the theory that the Flynn calls were the cause of the Russia/China flip-flop. It did not have to be the only cause, but the magnitude/speed of the flip would not be expected from typical counseling of the cabinet.

One objection to the theory is that the timing of the flip did not align with the disclosure that Flynn had lied to Pence. But the notification by the Justice Department  “weeks ago” removes the objection. The Flynn Affair was partly stage managed.

In a post of August 2016, CIA Chief: Trump “Unwitting agent of the Russian Federation”, I expressed concern identical to that of former CIA acting Director Michael Morell.  In a plot twist, the culprit is Flynn. The similarities between Michael Flynn and Harry Dexter White are striking. Neither considered himself an agent of a foreign power. Both took it upon themselves to autonomously make and execute foreign policy for the United States. Flynn’s actions may have been more grievous, because they vitiated possibilities for linkage in negotiation. His resignation is a signal that the Trump administration intends to reclaim that leverage.

From that post,

Has supreme self confidence been our undoing before? Harry Dexter White was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in 1946, U.S. representative to the Bretton Woods conference, and co-creator of the International Monetary Fund. He had numerous contacts with Soviet Intelligence that has lead to the somewhat debated conclusion that he was a Soviet spy.

Donald Trump’s Internal Conflicts  considers the possibility that Trump will change.  Perhaps he will trend towards the “internationalist” viewpoint, our valued heritage of  the architects of the post-war world. There is reason for hope.

Reuters: Baghdad’s bloody protests mark resumption of Shi’ite power struggle. This is tagged as “analysis”, which is good, because it can be analyzed differently. The piece asserts that Iran regards Nouri al-Maliki as their loyal ally, while pushing Muqtada al-Sadr to the periphery. This assumes much more certainty about the power structure of Iran than actually exists. Iran has confounded specialists (notice, I did not write “experts”) since the 1979 revolution.

In Iran, Foreign Policy, and Positivism, I wrote,

In the holy city of Qom, clerics churn out commentary, the quantity, aesthetic quality, and popularity of which define the reputation and power of an ayatollah and his school. The anatomy of the state, the veins through which the power flows, and the currency of  legitimate rule are different from any other state in the world today. It is a hybridization of Plato’s Republic (compare Plato’s ruling “guardians” with Iran’s Guardian Council)  with a state structure that until 2005 occasioned significant expression of secular ideas.

Most governments exhibit publicly noticeable obvious divergences of opinion. The Trump administration is the most recent example. But Iran is unique; the government has multiple centers of power, each with apparent license to carry on an independent foreign policy. It is commonly accepted that Iran’s government has three major entities, the secular, the IRG (Republican Guard), and the Qom religious establishment.

Each of these groups has by itself all the functional parts of a national government: sources of revenue, provision of services, court systems, and police powers. At various times, it has been speculated that the power of the IRG eclipsed the religious establishment. This is important, because it underlines the lack of certainty about Iran. Analysts who claim certainty in their analysis are playing to the audience. Adding to the complexity, factions within the Qom establishment have the ability to independently fund foreign policy “initiatives” through Iran’s financially huge and opaque bonyads (foundations.)

Al Monitor’s  “Is Iran about to cut Muqtada al-Sadr loose?” supports the notion that Sadr has become annoying to the Iranians. Statements by Ali Akbar Velayati and Khamenei himself support this.  But, quoting,

The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hossein Jaber Ansari, reacted to rumors of Sadr’s visit to Iran in mid-May 2016 after his supporters had stormed the parliament by saying that the Iraqi cleric was not on an official visit and that “no official meeting has taken place between him and Iranian officials….”

The visit was widely reported. Even the  WSJ picked it up. It may have been “fake news.”  If so, it was made plausible by his prior travels. Sadr spent three years in Iran, in self imposed “exile”.  It wasn’t for the sunshine. As a junior cleric with higher aspirations, most of it was likely in Qom, where he received education from the ultimate masters of Iranian society. Sadr’s family ancestry connects with Iran’s religious establishment. This is not unusual; Ali al-Sistani is Iranian. But it is not a neutral fact.

The search for simple conclusions requires that Iran is a unitary entity. With just one Iran, al-Sadr becomes  either an Iranian puppet or an Iraqi nationalist. But he is more likely  a pawn (with some independent attitude) of a particular Qom faction. In Qom, in quiet rooms of tea-drinking mullahs, religious debate, and constant publication, al-Sadr becomes the tangible expression of ambition in a religious wrapper.

There is no one puppet-master called Iran. The successful predictor will discover a methodology to determine which of the multiple images of  Iran is in ascendance.

Within weeks, the Trump Administration has flip-flopped on Russia/China.

In Tarzan-speak, the earlier monologue was,

(Cry) Me Trump. Trump friend of Russia. China no friend of me. Me kick China butt off islands. Taiwan no part of China, me friend Taiwan. Tarzan Europe no friend.

The monologue now goes,

(Cry) Me Trump. Trump like one China Taiwan. Russia missiles no good. Trump beat Russia missiles no good treaty. Trump no let Russia beat Ukraine. Trump like Europe. Trump help Europe.

The daily drama of the Trump Administration has obscured the speed of this amazing flip-flop, in a few short weeks, from favoring the world’s largest country to conciliating the world’s most populous.

If you’re into open source, this can’t pass as mere noise. Occam’s Razor allows us the simplest explanation:

• (Reuters) Flynn violated the Logan Act. This by itself is not considered important by many. No one has ever been prosecuted under the Act. It’s happened before, with no consequence.
• Washington Post: Flynn was not truthful about the substance of his conversations with officials of the Russian government.
• There is an atmosphere of fear, engendered more by Trump’s expressed admiration for Putin than Flynn’s actions.
• Congressional apprehension of Trump’s attitude towards Russia is bipartisan.
• Hypothesis: Trump has been told that the situation, in toto, is a liability that could become a crisis. It is fear-driven.
• The flip-flop removes most of the fear, thereby vitiating the significance of the current revelations and possible future discoveries.

The above explanation is functional without the elaboration of complex conspiracy theories.

How well could you do?

We continue Michael Flynn; Can Russia be Persuaded to Break with Iran? with an explanation of the “no” prediction. The several paragraphs that follow are supposed to jerk the American reader out of his particular pragmatic mindset, so as to appreciate the Russian mindset. You can skip them if you’re already there.

The expression “pragmatic foreign policy” has suffered the usual fate of the politicized; it’s been devalued. The general idea is that a pragmatic idea pursues realizable, tangible goals.  Perhaps it is best nailed down by it’s opposites: romantic. fanciful, wishful, dreamlike. But U.S. policy has always incorporated elements of the romantic. Perhaps the romantic part  is never decisive.  Cynics call it window dressing.

The  simple fact that democracies esteem each other, and the mutual dislike or distrust of democracies for nondemocratic regimes, promotes a fusion of the above.  But precise introspection is necessary to fully understand the different framework of an adversary. A consequence of pragmatism is not to think too far ahead of events. Every step of projection involves an element of imagination, pulling further away from the anchors of the current reality. When it’s good, it’s called contingency planning. In criticism, it becomes “not pragmatic.” Where to draw the line is elastically dependent upon personalities.

From our island continent/fortress, we watch the goings-on in Eurasia with a certain detachment of timescale. On this scale, the chessboard movements occur at a sedate pace. Nothing can happen in a day, month, or even a season, that will have more consequence than knock a point off the GNP. As a result, we tend to think of foreign policy goals as static, durable achievements. We might qualify this with, “Nothing lasts forever, but…”

The time scale diminishes as one gets closer to the action. The scale defined by the speed of a bullet, the warning time of an airstrike, or the time it takes to infiltrate and concentrate across a porous border; these are the concerns of a continental power. To such a power, there are no static goals. Foreign policy is a constant balancing act. Russia is a continental power.

Flynn’s desire that Russia  “break with Iran” is a consequence of American pragmatism. It implies that a chessboard solution to the regional problems  would be facilitated by a break. But to the Russian, continental mindset, it would simply be the removal of one potential balancing wheel, with points of influence, from the potentialities of solution.

The above is one distillation of thought. As always, there are others.  In the Middle East, beginning with  the rivalry of the Seven Sisters, it has been accepted as civilized behavior  to back opposing proxies. It doesn’t contradict diplomacy, trade, or cocktails in the evening. Russia-Turkey relations are a current example, with reasonably cordial relations and trade, in spite of conflict via proxies.

Positive, rather than negative, relations with Iran are important to Russia. Iran is dominantly Shiite. The Russian Caucasus, and the greater, dominantly Sunni 14% Muslim minority of Russia, are vulnerable to radicalization via porous southern borders. Shiite dominance of Iran acts as the equivalent of the species barrier of a biological pathogen. It is a cultural barrier to radicalization, instrumental to reducing the vulnerability of Russia to Sunni jihadist influence. It also reflects  Russian thinking that Shia Islam, though on an expansionist kick,  does not spawn stateless terrorism.

All students of history are acquainted with the concept of balance-of-power. In the 19th century, it was a phrase of the man on the street. For Russia, in the Middle East,  the meaning has transmuted a little. The modern goal is to direct the energies of smaller, neighboring powers, so that they cannot form a combination against Russia. Polarization with Iran, by accession to Michael Flynn’s wish, would remove Iran from the activity of balance. But Russia’s history teaches there can be no end to the balancing.

Although a “break” with Iran is not in the offing, effective cooperation is possible. But  Flynn does not appear to have appreciated the deficit of mutual trust. It cannot be unwound by mere conciliation.  I give my personal opinion that Ukraine  should be resolved first. Had it not been an issue at the time of Russia’s intervention in Syria, Russia’s proposal to jointly fight ISIS with the U.S. would have been received with greater consideration.

This is an opportunity for the skilled U.S. negotiator to take another look at  Linkage as a Foreign Policy Technique for the Trump Administration.

Next: Development of a Trump Middle East policy.

Reuters:  Kremlin says it wants apology from Fox News over Putin comments.  Quoting,

Fox News host Bill O’Reilly described Putin as “a killer” in the interview with Trump as he tried to press the U.S. president to explain more fully why he respected his Russian counterpart. O’Reilly did not say who he thought Putin had killed.

O’Reilly’s comments are in line with (CNN) Mitch McConnnel’s, who called Putin a thug. This tragic emphasis on words of vilification is the result of our fear Trump will give away the store, acting as the perhaps unwitting collaborator with an adversary. A few years from now, this could be true,  in fact, or opinion, or not at all. But we’re scared. We have a right to be.

After I had studied Vladimir Putin for a while, I realized that it is impossible to separate the man from the world in which he is embedded. It is an ethnocentric world of corrupt institutions and extrajudicial punishments,  coexisting with a western yearning that willed the  city of St. Petersburg into existence. In this milieu, there is a significant minority of completely modern  people who have hybridized themselves with the west. They are just like us, a confusing veneer.

Russia is demarcated by the world’s longest borders on which hostilities are conceivable. It has a population density of only 8.4 people per square kilometer, but it is highly urbanized. Most of the country is vacant, and lacking transport for quick mobilization, which is why the new Russian main battle tank weighs little more than a Sherman. Russia is indefensible from attack by an external actor, state or non-state, that activates ethnic tensions.

This affects the character of Russia and her rulers, in ways that are obvious, while the underlying psychology of threat remains hidden. Russia is constantly in search of security with respect to the nations that surround her. The search includes aggression. Putin is Russia’s current voice, but the theme is historical.

What we know that is distinctly about Putin the individual, as opposed to “Russia/Putin”, is extremely limited. A telling example, because it was so closely studied, is the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko. The final words of High Court judge Robert Owen’s report were, (Washington Post) “The FSB operation to kill Mr. Litvinenko was probably approved by Mr. [Nikolai] Patrushev [then head of the FSB] and also by President Putin.” I consider it a significant possibility, with all the motives in place, but not a probability. Too many members of Russia’s elite and intelligence establishment wanted Litvinenko dead. Of course, Owen may have access to classified information that I do not.

That is the closest we’ve ever gotten to incriminating Vladimir Putin. Russia has seen many unfortunate killings of journalists and muck rakers, but it is a land of many gangs and turfs. More than rule, Putin presides. He seemed to regret the death of Boris Nemtsov, a truely respectable man. It resulted in a police action that extended into Chechnya, with a messy ending. The ultimate instigators, looping back to Russian nationalists, may have escaped punishment. In the Russia that Putin inhabits, that may be the best one can expect.

The Russians have the Second Chechen War, and our fathers have the Vietnam War. We are not our fathers, but we have to acknowledge that about 388,000 tons of napalm were dropped in Vietnam between 1963 and 1973. By various means, the Vietnam war claimed between 195,000–430,000 civilian casualties. The very highest estimate of civilian casualties in Chechnya is 250,000, but the Society for Threatened Peoples International estimates 80,000.

So with an approximation of Chechnya tactics in Syria, Russia today is roughly comparable to the U.S.A. of 60 years ago, during the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. Yet many of us remember Johnson as a kind, if domineering man. The road to Hell is paved with good intentions.

I hope the above does not end up as an “alternative fact.” But in the stress of the current presidency, we risk making ourselves stupid. There no point in labeling Putin-the-man, because, with respect to our needs and concerns, Putin and Russia are one and the same. We’ve dealt with the Russians when they were much more adversarial than they are now. Under Reagan, the slogan was  “trust but verify.” Ironically, this is a Russian proverb.

We cannot rely on Fox News to preserve the Republic. That task falls to Mitch McConnell. I hope Senator McConnell’s vigilance will be informed by the quote of Henry Kissinger below.

On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and interim SALT agreement. On page 1254 of White House Years, Henry Kissinger writes,

For as far ahead as we can see, America’s task will be to re-create and maintain the two pillars of our policy toward the Soviet Union that we began to build in Moscow: a willingness to confront Soviet expansionism and a simultaneous readiness to mark out a cooperative future. A more peaceful world is prevented if we lean too far in either direction. When conciliation becomes an end in itself, a ruthless Soviet policy can turn it, as it occasionally has, into an instrument  of blackmail and a cover for unilateral gains…”

 Today, this resonates  with strong analogy.

Доверяй, но проверяй

Bloomberg: Trump Team Aims to Test Russia’s Alliance With Iran.  The most provocative statement comes up front:

As the Trump administration begins planning its outreach to Moscow, one question for the new president will be whether he can persuade Russia to turn away from Iran.

This is then restated with slight moderation,

“…they will explore the extent to which Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to end this relationship and cooperate with U.S. policy to counter Iranian aggression in Syria and the Middle East. ”

and then with the tentativeness of realism:

“It’s important to find out what are the limits of Russia’s willingness to cooperate with us with regard to Iran,” said Michael Ledeen, who during the transition served as an adviser to Michael Flynn…”

These are  lot of words to fuzz the issue. Does Flynn really imagine a breakup is possible, or is it an opening gambit? Some of the best reporting comes from Al-Monitor’s Hamidrez Azizi, an Iranian.  In Why are Syrian rebels stepping up efforts to isolate Iran?, he writes

It seems that the main impetus behind the rebels’ disinclination toward an Iranian role is their hope that more serious US involvement on the Syrian issue under Donald Trump’s administration could prompt Moscow to reconsider its ties with Tehran, which, in the end, could result in a diminished Iranian role in the equation of the future of Syria.

That this kind of reporting could come out of Tehran is a remarkable illustration of the dichotomy of Iran’s politics, dominated by the sometimes visible, sometimes hidden hand of the Qom establishment. With another shift, the writer could be imprisoned.

Let’s pose a question, of the type that might have appeared on the website of the IARPA  “Forecasting World Events” crowd sourcing project:

“Will Trump’s administration succeed in convincing Russia to break with Iran?”

As a crowd sourcing  question, the question by itself is not enough. Rigorous, reportable, decidable criteria for a “yes” must accompany it, such as:

“If any of the following occur, as reported by recognized media, by such-and-such a date:”

• A rupture of diplomatic relations.
• Hostilities between Russia and Iran.
• Restriction of arms supply by Russia to Iran. This includes an ambiguity: sales or deliveries?
• A vote by Russia in the P5+1 framework against Iran.

My prediction would be “no.”

To be continued shortly.

I have been wondering what I could write about the current immigration controversy that would be worth reading. My personal feelings about immigration have no weight and little relevance. But then I thought of something. I lived with a Muslim family for five years.

In what follows, bear in mind that I am a secular person. I do not empathize with what believers call “faith”, though I understand the attraction very well. It seems to be something that most people need in some form. I am more in tune with Stephen Hawking. I have no trouble with abstractions. Most people do.

We had a family member who suffered a long illness requiring 24 hour care. Such care is affordable only from people on the margins of existence. This Muslim family of native-born Americans came to our house, from the inner city, as caregivers. They lived on a dead-end street dominated by drug dealers. Gunfire was frequent. For the head of the family, the challenge was keeping his own home inviolate. Drug dealers would literally trespass the inside of their dwelling. Their travails included every aspect of existence. Yet they acquired and kept an insular pride.

The household head was the first convert to Islam. Although he had never been to college, he learned Arabic, became fluent in Islamic theology, made Hajj, and became the external spokesperson for his mosque. He remarked that returning home, he felt so much better, so fortunate, to be back in the United States. He expressed affection for this country. Some of his opinions were troubling. His mosque had been one of the first in the U.S. to condemn terrorism in most cases. I would have preferred to hear, “all cases.” He believed that a caliphate is the ideal form of government. I favor strict separation of church and state. He wanted his wife to wear the burqa, but she refused. There was no evidence of subordinate status. They had family democracy.

I think they converted because Islam offered more than other creeds of order, identity, and, to some extent,  self-imposed isolation from an environment hostile to good intent. These ulterior motives are hidden from the believers themselves.

His wife was the caregiver. They had a vulnerable daughter, and a gaggle of extended family they brought to live with us. Food tended to vanish from the fridge. I complained, and they brought it back. They were, if not on the edge of starvation, chronically underfed.

One day the whole crew showed up, including their best conversion specialist, a woman in burqa. I was the target. She cited their holy book as a “self revealing text”. This is a recognized theological term,  meaning that a text serves as its own proof.  If I only read it, I would know it was true. She asserted that I must be desirous to know the origin of all things, which, she alleged, the text would provide. She whacked away at it with the expertise of the best cult recruiter. As a special fruit, she alleged that Islam contradicted no science. But she said that she was glad she had been converted before going to college. She felt it resulted in stronger faith (“It took better…”) than had it been the other way around.

Since my own secular ontological holdings are beyond the comprehension of most people, I decided on the “possum defense”, to play dead. I feigned no curiosity. They tried to arouse it. I played the dullest person imaginable, interested only in sitcoms and the dinner menu. It went round and round. If they had not by now become intimates, it might have been interesting to bait them. After three hours, they gave up in disgust.

But our friendship was untarnished. Knowing that I was beyond the reach of conversion, they never tried again. They served until the last dying breath. Some weeks later, the severance was exhausted. They were desperate again. On two occasions, I slipped the wife small sums of money. When the family head found out about it, payment for no work, he was extremely angry, and forbade it.

Our last contact was an unexpected visit some years later. The caregiver herself was now mortally ill. He brought her to our house to remember the good times. I don’t remember the prolonged illness of a family member as a good time, but I was gratified that they did.

This is one experience with Islam. There are other experiences, which is why the debate is so wrenching.