(NBC) U.S. officials: Iran official OK’d attacks on American military. Quoting,

One U.S. official said Iran usually conceals the missiles and components when delivering them to the Houthis. These missiles are visible to overhead surveillance, leading to concerns Iran could attempt to launch missiles from the dhows. There are some indications they have mobile launchers on board, as well, one of the officials said.

Technical collections of the intelligence community are usually more informative than open source, except in one way, the gauging of intentions. But this quote is good for intentions:

…the Iranian regime has told some of its proxy forces and surrogates that they can now go after American military personnel and assets in the region, according to three U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence.

The  dhows may contain onboard launchers, as opposed to launchers for shore deployment. The IRGC have an operational suicide doctrine, which differs only in philosophy from the suicides of Islamic terror.  It is justified as a practical weapon, to be used when there is no alternative. In  challenge to U.S. naval power, this is now the case. Unlike the land launches by Houthis against the USS Mason, where the attackers could vanish, a dhow launch is a form of suicide.

So the argument of US official: Iran has moved missiles to Persian Gulf, based on deniability, is  compromised. It will become irrelevant if a missile is actually launched from a dhow. It would define the divide between Iran’s secular and religious components as more stark than even the imprisonment of Rouhani’s brother implies.

That argument also assumes the Iranians want a demonstration of success to motivate their suicide crews. The attack on the Mason did not provide this, because the attack did not reach the point of saturation of the Mason’s radar. But a close-in suicide attack, engaging the Phalanx CIWS system, has a  chance of causing at least minor ship damage. A swarm attack could do more.

Quoting,

“The intelligence is real,” said a senior Democratic congressional official briefed on the intelligence, “but the response seems wildly out of proportion.”

The deployment of a carrier strike group is appropriate. If the dhow threat becomes actual versus potential, as indicated by a missile launch, the best defense/deterrent is rapid elimination of the dhows.

The threat against U.S. land forces is not so easily countered. The strength and composition of these forces is not intended for large engagements. The isolated locations of U.S. forces within Iraq, combined with air power, provide some protection against concentration of opposing forces. But  freedom of movement, in small units in counterinsurgency operations, would go to zero.

The Kurd Referendum; Implications for U.S. Policy offers a prediction, from September 29, 2017, that centers on the Kurds. They may yet play a role; read down. But there are so many ways the cake can crumble:

…Unless Brinton’s sequence can be averted, the U.S. position will become untenable. The nature of extremists could make resolution impossible. The curtain on this conflict rises perhaps a year, or a bit more, from now.

Quoting from Trump wants U.S. military in Iraq to ‘watch Iran’: CBS interview,

The far west locations of the bases provide some insulation against sectarian strife. But how Iraq will fall apart is as hard as predicting how a goblet will shatter when dropped.

• • For a clean break into a few large pieces, the bases are an asset.
  • Bases are useful if there is enough coherence to request U.S. assistance, but the U.S. response would have to be massive.
  • With total shattering, and  many sharp pieces, the bases become “Mortarvilles”, exposed to grinding attrition.

Plan to Defeat ISIS Part 3; 1000 Troops to Kuwait; New Doctrine, outlines a doctrine that provides an alternative with some functionality in a non permissive environment. Quoting,

…None of these had geopolitical goals of the type pursued by the U.S. All of the above are characterized by the temporary seizure of territory. They were ephemeral. They offer suggestions as to how the U.S. can project power into a region with weak or nonexistent states, and hostile non-state forces:

• • Deploy very, very quickly.
  • Accomplish the objective, but without the usual finality or thoroughness.
  • Get out before non-state forces can react to the presence.

This “Doctrine of Ephemeral Deployment.” is not new. Von Clausewitz thought of it some time between 1816 and 1830.

While the U.S. military has the unique ability to maintain a presence in hostile environments, such as Afghanistan, it may be in circumstances that prohibit achievement of  foreign policy goals. If continued presence in Iraq is required, it may be necessary to dispose of constraints that stem from the concept of Iraq as a state in political balance:

• Reluctance to support Kurdish autonomy, if not independence.
• The idea that Sunni nationalism is in all forms a bad thing.

The current dilemma provokes an idea to be explored in the games of counterfactual history: U.S. foreign policy goals are too rigidly guided by strategic doctrine, to the neglect of opportunity and practicality.

(CNN) US official: Iran has moved missiles to Persian Gulf.

Iran’s government has a hydra head. Foreign policy initiatives are developed separately by different elements of the power structure, secular, and religious, with multiple  operators in Qom.

In the past, there has been speculation that the IRGC is a third power center, which may be why on April 21, Khamenei  replaced former IRGC head Mohammad Ali Jafari with Hossein Salami. In view of the risks of   missile use, Jafari may have “gone soft”, with concern for the health of his men.

The hypothesis that Khamenei et al. have decided for serious confrontation gets a boost from the (May 4, Al Jazeera) sentencing of President Rouhani’s brother, Hossein Fereydoun (Rouhani’s “eyes and ears”), to jail for unspecified crimes for an unspecified duration. This technique, with multiple imprisonments of his cabinet, was used against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to hamstring his administration until he could he could lose the 2009 election.

Is there something more we can tease out of open source? A template based on the recent past gives insight into Iranian tactics, which emphasize surprise, asymmetry, and deniability. Against the background of comparatively moderate posturing by the secular government, attacks against U.S. forces have occurred in a deniable manner.

Shiite militias in Iraq  received missiles in 2018. (Reuters) Exclusive: Iran moves missiles to Iraq in warning to enemies. There is no indication they have wasted them on shots at terrorists.  It has been stated that Iran has transferred manufacturing technology to militia. Although a militia could build a Palestinian Qassam rocket, the same is not possible for a Scud-type product.  The skills transfer can be no more than final assembly.

Yemen’s land mass and civil war have also served Iranian deniability.  The Scud-type missile launched from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, and the later Badr P-1 were provided by Iran. They were almost certainly moved into Yemen by boat. Houthi announcements imply they pushed the button themselves. But if Iranian technicians sighted the missiles and pushed the launch button, only precious HUMINT could tell the difference.

Since there is concern that the missiles being moved by boat could be launched from  boats, the Chinese designed C-802 Silkworm is implied. But a boat launch would not serve deniability. The C-802 is extensively deployed for land launch at the Strait of Hormuz.

Where could missiles be emplaced and launched in a deniable way? A locale must be lawless, buyable, and deniable. It must adjoin the Red Sea,  which must be transited by the U.S. forces that use the Suez Canal. Lawless locations are implied by pirate activity. Most of the pirate havens have been cleaned out. Pirate activity  persisted in  the Galmudug region of Somalia  till at least 2017. (FP)  Somalia’s Pirates Are Back in Business. This shows what is possible. perhaps further up the coast towards Bab el Mandeb.

Eritrea, inside the Red Sea, above and adjacent to the strait Bab el Mandeb, is geographically perfect.  The Eritrean Islamic Jihad implies contested territory that Iran could rent for missile emplacements, which can be effectively camouflaged. The narrowness of the strait facilitates visual spotting, helpful since the only Houthi controlled radar station was destroyed in the aftermath of the attack on the USS Mason.  See U.S.S. Mason; 3rd Missile Attack; Asymmetric Warfare with Iran. See also Houthi Missile Attacks on U.S. Destroyer; Iran Culprit, which considers the use of small spotter boats with optical sighting devices.

Iranian emphasis on  (Reuters) small-boat swarming attacks suggests there may be an element of coordination of attacks on naval targets with launches by Shiite militia against U.S. land forces.

Conclusion: If Khamenei gets the nerve to push the button, saturation attacks are possible from shore based missiles in the Red Sea. Coordinated  land attacks by Shiite militia may occur, particularly by those with an integrated Iranian component.

Iran has not overtly engaged the U.S. military since the 1988 Operation Praying Mantis, an event of the Tanker War. But if deniable attacks against a high value target, such as a carrier, are judged successful, Iran may be emboldened to launch from boats. They don’t plan to win, but neither do they aim to lose.

.

The problem of interception is hard for non-math people to understand. There is a gap between engineers and policy makers. What follows is an entertainment for a rainy Sunday, in the form of a board game. You will need:

• a checker board
• one red checker
• one black checker
• a coin for tossing
• some curiosity

A critic might deflect the insight as the result of “gross oversimplification.”  Don’t let him get away with it. Challenge him instead to offer his own board game.

• Start by placing a single red checker on the edge of the board, in either the black or white square closest to the middle. The red checker is the adversary’s hypersonic warhead, perhaps an Avangard.
• Place a black checker in the corresponding position on the opposite side. This corresponds to your interceptor missile.

A turn of play consists of one movement by the red checker, followed by one by the black checker. But each moves according to different rules. The move of each checker  consists of two steps:

• The first step of a movement advances a checker towards the opposite side of the board by one square.
• The second step  moves the checker to the right or left, a lateral displacement.
• The red checker must move two steps lateral, to the left or right, according to a coin toss. There is no red “player.” You are playing against the coin.
• The black checker must move one step to the left or right, your choice.

In this game, distances are not accurately represented.  It’s like a subway map. It’s on the critic to improve without resorting to the “reality is too complicated” defense.

The victory conditions:

• You win if you manage to place the black checker directly in front of the red checker. This corresponds to an impact, a “hard kill.”
• You lose if the red checker passes the black one, or reaches a parallel position. Your black checker cannot turn around and pursue.

The above is the hypersonic version of the problem. For the ballistic missile version, one rule is different.

• The red checker now proceeds straight across the board with no lateral moves.
• The black checker still makes lateral moves, representing noise in the system. Refine this if you wish, by replacing certain lateral movement with randomness. For example, a  lateral move occurs only if two heads come up in a row.

So the game is short. You could prolong it if you happen to have more checkerboards to arrange in a 2×2 square. As simple as it is, it illustrates the basic problem.

If you play the hypersonic version many times, you will sometimes win. On average, the black checker-interceptor will miss the red checker-warhead by a number related to the classic random problem of the “drunk’s walk”, or “random walk.”  Since you have the game, you don’t have to do any math. Get a coin out, play the game 10 times, and let me know.

Who knows? If you can figure out a way to win this game consistently, DARPA might be talking to you. In Part 3, we’ll explain how the game relates to the actual problem.

At least it doesn’t cost you any quarters.

A good place to start is Iain Boyd’s understated article, (CBS News) U.S., Russia, China race to develop hypersonic weapons.  It may be the only article in the popular press that offers measured assessment. But the most important statement, somewhat overshadowed by the depiction of U.S. inferiority, appears towards the end as a tentative suggestion. It’s worth highlighting with a quote:

“It is not clear if the types of interceptors that have been developed for defense against slower weapons will be effective against hypersonic missiles. Entirely novel approaches may be needed to defeat this new threat. Examples include high-power lasers and beams of electromagnetic energy.”

The article concludes with the catch-all,

“I believe that to avoid an important gap in U.S. defensive capabilities, American efforts in defense must at least keep up with the progress of other nations in developing hypersonic weapons.”

This nonspecific conclusion, descending to common sense, is the weakest point, because we are resource limited.

DARPA has initiated the proposal process for Glide Breaker, with the goal of impact-hard-kill against a particular category of hypersonic vehicles, boost-glide. This is problematic in several ways:

• While China strategic weapons appear to fall in the category of boost-glide, Russia’s Avangard system  is not; see Russia’s Hypersonic Missile; Reverse Engineering Secrets of Avangard.
• Boyd’s first quote, to which I add emphasis of certainty, implies that physical interception-hard-kill is (a) probably impossible. (b) If it is possible, changes to the adversary design would make it impossible.
• The hypersonic threat has such potential variation, and interceptors have such specificity, that the effort to counter is likely to end in resource exhaustion.
• Theodor Postol spent half a lifetime arguing the impossibility, on solid physical grounds, of effective ABM defense. He came as close to mathematical proof as one can  in the strategic realm. Supporters of missile defense found it unnecessary to refute, because decision makers don’t understand proofs. Now we have a second proof. As hypersonic vehicles are more difficult in all ways to intercept than ballistic missiles, interception is also impossible.

Decision makers are confused because, in tests, interceptors occasionally work. Some systems, such as THAAD, have performed remarkably well in tests, but are technically limited in ways the civilian policy-maker is unlikely to understand. Each interceptor is rigidly designed for a particular regime of altitude and velocity. The PAC-3 Patriot, specialized to ballistic missiles,  missed drones powered by the equivalent of  lawnmower engines, on multiple occasions. (Times of Israel) IDF: Patriot missile fired at incoming UAV from Syria, which retreats.

DARPA Glide-Breaker aspires to counter a new threat that is technically far more difficult than ballistic missiles, against which there is no practical defense. DARPA employs the services of engineers and scientists to solve strategic problems. These two fields,  engineering and strategy, employ  different modes of logic and habits of thought. When  engineering ventures into strategic thinking, and vice-versa, expensive errors of national policy can result.

The 1991 Gulf War provided early warning of this conundrum. SCUD missiles were so poorly engineered that they broke up in flight, with irregular trajectories that could not be matched by the Patriot system of that era. Frontline summarizes:

Such a Scud therefore came down with a relatively heavy warhead and a heavy motor, separated by the light empty fuel tank. It was structurally unstable and often broke up in the upper atmosphere. That further reduced its already poor accuracy, but it also made the missile difficult to intercept, since its flight path was unpredictable.

Simple randomization of the trajectory, which Avangard does in spades, was enough to defeat antimissile defense. Bad engineering defeats the specificity of good engineering.

One of the characteristics of the PAC-3 version is increased maneuverability  at high altitude, which resulted in reduced maneuverability at low altitudes. This improvement is vastly outclassed by the real or potential maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles, except in a specific part of the trajectory, which is specific to the adversary.

This implies that the adversary could, at relatively reduced cost, produce a core missile with different clothing aerodynamics. (The AIDS virus defeats the immune system by this strategy.) By varying the fuselage structure of a compatible core, flight characteristics become randomized. Which vehicle are we shooting at today?

To be a productive engineer, one has to stay focused on the problem. There are little problems and big ones, and a different focus on each. But the engineering mindset seldom extends to, “Should we be doing this at all?” Instead, the engineer offers a metric of success for the given specifications of a limited goal. Should we always buy? How are we thinking about this? This is strategy.

Part 1 ends with a joke quoted from Reddit.

In 1935, Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges wrote the short story,The Approach to Al-Mu’tasim.  As with all of Borges’ stories, it is brief and dense with meaning, a critique of a fictitious novel that Borges invents as a plot device. Quoting Wikipedia,

The narrator then summarizes the plot of the novel. The book is a detective story about a freethinking Bombay law student of Islamic background. He becomes involved in a sectarian riot in which he impulsively kills a Hindu, after which he becomes an outcast among the lower classes of India. …

He meets a man who, though destitute, is happy and spiritual. The student encounters many such people radiating a small amount of this spiritual clarity. From these experiences, he infers the existence of a perfect man, whom he calls Al-Mu’tasim. (Al-Mu’tasim means “he who goes in quest of aid” or “the seeker of shelter”.)^[2] This perfect man is a higher spiritual being, the source and originator of this pure spiritual clarity. Obsessed with meeting Al-Mu’tasim, the student goes on a pilgrimage through Hindustan to find him. He eventually hears the voice of the Al-Mu’tasim resounding from a hut. He pulls back the curtain and goes in. The book ends at this point. The reviewer then gives his criticisms of the work.

Borges’ story is fiction, yet it illuminates in two ways:

• The inference of a “perfect man” is analogous to the problem of the “mastermind”. When can the existence of a “mastermind” be inferred,  and when is it just a leap of imagination?
• The story intertwines murder with the problem of human perfection.  It offers an empathic view of the mind of the terrorist, as only fiction can provide.

Borges’ story was an unconscious influence towards the theory of a mastermind, presented in Sri Lanka Bombings.

(CNN) Sri Lanka attack death toll rises to 290.

To identify the name of the group, and affiliations, will be solved by police work, not speculation.  It is not too early to think about how this relates to global terrorism. The bombings have features that set them apart from others:

• With high confidence, both the perpetrators and victims come from groups that are minorities: Islamic terror against Christian groups.
• The prior ethic conflict, the Sri Lanka Civil War, Tamil versus Sinhalese, has nothing to do with it.
• During the Civil War, the Tamils were internally fractured by multiple political and military groups. As with FARC in Colombia, this assures that there are significant numbers of Tamils who are still aggrieved.  Even today, FARC sympathizers can be found just a ten minute drive out of Medellin.
• The majority of Tamils are Hindu, but 10% of the total Sri Lanka population is Muslim; most Muslims are Tamil speakers, though not culturally Tamils.
• 10% Muslim against 7.4% Christian seems thin gruel for an insurrection.

Islamic terrorism has tended to directly target  groups they wish to displace. Then why not the majority of Sri Lanka, who are Buddhist?

A recurring idea among terrorists of all kinds, including White Nationalists in the U.S., is to artificially kindle a conflict to weaken existing society, thereby facilitating their goals.  But as the Islamic population  of Sri Lanka is small, a direct attack on the Sinhalese majority could provoke a backlash, both official and grass-roots, too violent to withstand.

To be considered is the possibility that an intellectual core of “masterminds” have devised a kindling strategy particularized for Sri Lanka,  carefully staged to avoid effective counter-terrorism at an early stage. The strategy might have these elements:

• The antagonism of the Christian community results in an enforcement activity directed at Muslim elements within the Tamils, enough to antagonize the Tamils, but not resulting in effective action against the terrorists.
• Antagonism of the Tamils creates sanctuary space for the terrorists within the Tamil community.
• Relying on the Tamil tendency towards political fracture, demonstrated during the Civil War, the terrorists hijack part of the community.
• With enlarged resources, the terrorists increase the tempo of attacks, as Tamils flock to them in the face of Sinhalese repressive measures.
• The immediate goal: a chunk of Tamil territory.  The Mystical goal: the whole island is repopulated.

This sounds crazy to us. (Particularly, since the majority of Tamil-speaking Muslims are not culturally Tamils.)

But it cannot be judged by the yardstick of rationality. Mystical thinking  bridges all gaps of logic. It implies one prediction to be tested by police work: The design of  attacks, focusing on Christians, is a foreign import. Since Indonesia and Malaysia are loci of church bombings, some suicidal, little ideological packaging is required.

This theory conveniently explains why responsibility has not yet been claimed. It involves reasoning of such complex fiction, the perpetrators may not understand it themselves.

(Reuters) U.S. intelligence says Huawei funded by Chinese state security: report.

The server that hosts Intel9.us records attempted hacks.  For those who are not familiar with server management, most websites are subject to constant attacks, producing large samples amenable to analysis.

In the case of Intel9, most attacks trace to rented servers and botnets. A small proportion of them, identified by reverse-IP lookup, appear to originate from  China companies. At least one of them has a well-known name. In other cases involving the Baidu search engine, the server may be owned by Baidu, or the user-agent string forged to fit the “white list.”

(Lawfare) Beijing’s New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense explains the legal obligation of such companies to participate in espionage. Questions:

• Arer these companies are aware of these activities, or have they themselves been hacked?
• Are such companies required to participate to a minor degree to demonstrate  compliance with the National Intelligence Law?
• Is the participation of these companies fully revealed by reverse-IP, or does obfuscation hide more of it?

The severity of the problem is not yet appreciated by many members of the EU. (Reuters) Belgian cybersecurity agency finds no threat from Huawei. No greater threat to freedom exists.

(Stratfor) Libya: Russia, U.S. Will Not Support U.N. Security Council Draft Resolution Calling for Tripoli Cease-Fire. Quoting,

Why It Matters: The U.S. decision not to support the resolution may indicate that Washington is considering shifting its stance toward supporting the Libyan National Army and its commander, Field Marshal Khalifa Hifter [Haftar].

The shift has a surprising element, since Stratfor also states that Haftar is not clearly winning. This is far more significant than if he was. Quoting,

According to the latest reports, LNA members have been retreating toward al-Ghariyana as they have struggled to break into Tripoli’s southern districts.

I’ve been a Haftar fan from the start. He lived here for  two decades, and made the politically significant choice of U.S. citizenship. Before we get  intellectual, let’s use a broad brush:

• He’s one of ours.
• He despises Islamism, the theocratic intrusion of religion into government.
• He has no enthusiasm for democracy in Libya.

Haftar’s aim is the overthrow of a government that was formed by a consensual process that included some elections, though the electoral process was discontinuous. Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, though honored mostly in the breach, states

“…none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by a military coup or decree.”

Carthage was a city; Libya is not.  The U.S. realization is that the Government of National Accord, confined to a single city, with only partial recognition by other elements, and a discontinuous electoral process, does not conform with the definition of democracy assumed by the Foreign Assistance Act.

This is the broad brush. In Russians Deploy to back Libya’s Haftar, I wrote,

• As a consequence of the U.S. historical tradition of religious tolerance and democracy, U.S. foreign policy in previous administrations has attempted to embrace Islamism without prejudice or distinction. The U.S.  backed Islamists who feigned  the pretense of democracy, such as Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi, and Syrian rebels.

There is a reflexive U.S. tendency to oppose Russian initiatives, which are frequently, though not always, damaging to U.S. interests. Quoting,

• Russia is our adversary, for various reasons that have entirely to do with aggression and subversion in Europe.

Through sloppy thinking, this tends to  generalize to  the assumption, left over from the Cold War, that Russia will inevitably pull a society down.  Russia is a state of intermediate development. Whether a Russian intervention is likely to damage the development of a client state, or help it, depends upon the client’s development.  In Venezuela, or Eastern Europe, Russia may do great harm. In Libya or Syria, there are no institutions to damage, although Russian tactics often cause large loss of life.

The battle for Tripoli hangs in balance. Haftar’s forces have exhibited uncoordinated movements, with losses in ambush. A low-tech army is plagued by the fog of war, not knowing the locations of one’s own units, as well as those of the enemy. Haftar’s demonstrated sympathy for the U.S. can be enhanced by the provision of a type of aid at which the U.S. is superlative, battlefield intelligence, gathered mainly via technical collections.

The taking of a city: John Toland’s The Last 100 Days (of the 3rd Reich), Part 3, chronicles how the Austrian resistance group “0-5” saved Vienna from total destruction by guiding Soviet troops around the German flank, through the Vienna Woods, and into the city from the rear.

These days it’s all technical.

(Reuters) Exclusive: Dispute flares among U.S. officials over Trump administration Iran arms control report. Quoting

The report’s publication follows the administration’s formal designation on Monday of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Iran’s elite paramilitary and foreign espionage unit, as a foreign terrorist organization.

The case that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism has the very respectable General James Mattis attached.  Quoting from General Mattis; Iran continues to sponsor terrorism; Iran, Iran, Iran,

“At the time when I spoke about Iran I was a commander of US central command and that (Iran) was the primary exporter of terrorism, frankly, it was the primary state sponsor of terrorism and it continues that kind of behavior today,”

At the time I argued with use of the word:

I agree with all but the choice of words. Iran is in an expansionist, revolutionary phase, not unlike the early years of the Soviet Union. Unlike any other state adversary extant, it also exports an ideology, with the gleam of the caliphate, something we were hoping would not recur since the downfall of communism.

Iran has at times lead the world in assassinations on foreign soil, and continues to have a very active program. But so does Russia.  Particularly hateful to Mattis is the slaughter of Marines in the Khobar Towers bombings in 1996. The principal  Iranian controlled agent, Ahmed al-Mughassil was captured in 2015. (Brookings) Captured: Mastermind behind the 1996 Khobar Towers attack. Some say the Iranians deliberately betrayed him. This is possible, since at the time the moderates were ascendant.

The domino theory, so popular during the Cold War, is alive again. I might be one of the proponents, but unlike those who justified the Vietnam war with the fear that North Vietnam would take over Southeast Asia, I have no solution. If there is a row of dominoes, Iraq is first in line. This proposition is partly indexed in Trump wants U.S. military in Iraq to ‘watch Iran’: CBS interview. The blog search for Sistani brings up all the pieces.

The gist is that Iran, several times the center of an empire, will, with a certain degree of inevitability, swallow its politically weak neighbor. Complicating any U.S. effort to prevent this is the prediction that Iraq will in a few years become inhospitable to any U.S. presence. (2/4/2019 NY Times) Trump’s Plan for U.S. Forces in Iraq Met With Unified Rejection in Baghdad. Quoting,

President Trump’s unexpected announcement that he wanted American troops in Iraq to stay there to “watch Iran” achieved a previously unattainable goal on Monday: unity in the Iraqi political establishment….The unity was a collective rejection of his proposal, and added momentum to proposed legislation that could hamper American troops’ ability to operate in Iraq.

The Trump administration has innovated a number of aspects of U.S. foreign policy in positive ways. This is not one of them. As an author of the idea that Iran will absorb Iraq,  I would certainly like to avert the event. But Pax Americana is done with, and we have to pick our battles. To declare the IRGC a terrorist organization offers advantages with respect to sanctions and rules of engagement, but not enough to overcome the hostility of a whole region, including the part to be defended.

Talk loudly and carry a small stick? Talleyrand (if you like him), or a Kissinger (whether you like him or not), were successful at statecraft in a world of diminishing influence, which Kissinger actually anticipated  by 40 years. Both understood force, diplomacy backed by force, and had the bargaining skills of a union organizer. They also knew how to fold most advantageously.

Of choices to be made, with limited resources, I  prefer Venezuela.

(CNN) North Korea tests ‘tactical’ weapon, report says. Quoting a South Korean assessment,

A South Korean government source with military knowledge told CNN that weapon was likely a piece of long-range artillery “likely to be a multiple rocket launcher.” At the time, South Korean Unification Ministry deputy spokeswoman Lee Eu-gene downplayed the significance of the 2018 event, saying Kim had been continuing his inspections in the military sector “intermittently.”

The downplay could reflect the actual state of affairs. But there is a worrying alternative, made possible by the participation of physicists from the former Soviet Union. In the past few years, the North’s nuke program, formerly glacial, has produced a torrent of results.

Quoting,

No missile launch was detected by US Northern Command and Strategic Command, according to US Department of Defense officials.

The absence of a missile launch detection, if not a very small missile, still allows a weapon like the nuclear Davy Crockett M-28, which resembles an upsized Panzerfaust antitank weapon from World War II. The recoilless rifle design consists of a launcher tube containing a powder charge that acts against a stick  within the barrel. At the forward end of the stick is a bulb that contains the destructive device. The Panzerfaust contained a conventional shaped charge. The Davy Crockett contained a version of the W54 nuclear warhead.

Is Kim inviting us to fill in the blank after “tactical” with “nuclear”? An assessment  could center on the shape of the plutonium pit in the “primary” of a warhead. Two practical choices exist: round, or like a football (elliptical)/ linear implosion. Round is most efficient, and requires the least fissile material. Elliptical/ linear implosion is the choice of space limited applications, like a skinny MIRV warhead,  a nuclear artillery shell, or a Davy Crockett.

In flight, the Davy Crockett is a skinny stick with a bulb on the front. The fatter the bulb, the less aerodynamic it is. The greater yield of the round design is of no value with very short range, as some distance is required to survive even a very small nuclear explosion.

Although the U.S. makes wide use of linear implosion primaries with elliptical pits, a publicity photo of a happy Kim with a North Korean  “physics package”  goes against this design. Missile warheads are more sensitive  to weight and yield than to shape. Linear implosion requires more fissile material, with greater weight for a given yield than a “round” design.

Should we look for evidence of linear implosion to rule in/out a battlefield weapon of Davy Crockett ilk? This risks captivation by the U.S. approach to weapons design, which aims for best-in-class. North Korea’s iffy rockets  dispose of this.

A battlefield tactical nuclear weapon could be astonishingly primitive yet still deliver the goods. A sufficiently vertical trajectory, as with a mortar, can optimize the range of the most awkward projectile.   Similar astonishment comes with Russia’s Hypersonic Missile; Reverse Engineering Secrets of Avangard.

However primitive, resumption of nuke testing is implied, to optimize a physics package to fly on the front of a stick.

They know how to do it at Warwick Castle.