They think they can win this fight. The distinctions of strategic versus tactical victory allow this possibility. Famously, the U.S. won virtually every battle of the Vietnam War, yet lost. The early victories of Japan in World War II were stunning. The limit of the process, the clock, is defined by limits of material resources or political will. The mullahs know they have fewer of the former, but more of the latter.
With the penetrations of the GBU-57A/B MOP, the mullahs now understand the difference between soft rock, the sedimentary strata of Fordow, and hard igneous rock elsewhere.
The mullahs judge they can handle domestic unrest with as much killing as required.
The mullahs do not fear invasion. One of the most quoted strategic shibboleths is “Air power cannot win a war.” The accompanying explanation is that it takes boots on the ground to seize territory. The recent near exception of Venezuela was a decapitation strike. This was facilitated by what, in retrospect, was a remarkable lack of redundancy in the Venezuelan government.
Can a decapitation strike in Iran achieve the goal of regime change? The answer depends on three calculations we may not know how to make:
- Success of the strike, measured against the survival of the target.
- Political implications. See Iran Protests; Is Revolution Nigh?
- Viability of an insurgency.
This last factor has small mention in open source, except for the widely despised Mojahedin-e-Khalq. An insurgency is vital to seize power; otherwise it will simply lapse to surviving elements of the current regime.
As a benchmark, insurgent forces in Iran are far weaker than those fostered in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation; see Operation Cyclone. Broad access to sophisticated small arms is essential.