No, but the possibility draws closer. If there are serious revolutionary cabals in Iran, with access to resources that can be diverted or co-opted, they wisely remain hidden pending a significant, anticipated, unavoidable event, the passing of Khameini. With that strainer in place, the eventful, public demonstrations and violence are composed of individuals and groups that do not have those resources.

I have referred to Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution twice before. The dynamics of the 1979 overthrow of the Shah are strikingly similar to the French Revolution, though the issues of religion, and estates were ironically opposite.  The French tried to abolish religion; the 1979 revolution established it. The French abolished the estates; 1979 established new ones. It would be natural to inquire if a new Iranian revolution could simply run in reverse. But while the present is now discredited, the pre-1979 past remains discredited.

Quoting from Iran and The Anatomy of Revolution,

Brinton’s characterization of the  prodromal phase of revolution implies forbidden transition, in the absence of:

• • • A period of  increasing prosperity, followed by sudden reversal. Not in Iran, where the economy has gone from bad to worse.
    • Incompetent use of power. Brinton’s meaning is power against internal opponents. In 1979,  the Shah met this criteria, killing just enough people to irritate the rest. Not so under Khamenei, whose government is liberal with torture and death.
    • Involvement of the masses with Brinton’s stereotypical grievances. A weak, qualified yes. Urban and rural protestors are dissatisfied for different reasons; urban protests are cultural, while the rural poor want jobs. There is no evidence of coordination between these groups.

The Bazaar has a Brinton analogy as an economic barometer; much has been made of the protests of the Bazaar. But in 1979, the Bazaaris were the nexus of Iran’s economy. Today, they are the equivalent of a huge shopping mall. The analogy is technically blocked by the absence of previous prosperity, but let it slide.

Brinton’s path remains blocked by the competence of the regime at repression. If the Shah, who was well known for the terrors of SAVAK, was as enthusiastic with machine guns in the streets, the result could have been quite different.

The masses are more broadly involved, but there is a missing element. They know what they don’t want. They can’t articulate the achievable replacement. Economic demands are unreachable without repealing the core hostilities of the state. The demand for regime change is concrete, but what comes after? Concrete demands lack the directional arrow of an ideology. Humans have a weakness for ideology, even when it’s a pack of lies. None of Iran’s problems, save hijab, are immediately solvable. Ideology provides the unity and patience for a future that may never come. Khomeini was so proud of his, he offered it to Gorbachev.

Khomeini’s contribution was Velayat-e faqih, the “guardianship of the Islamic jurist”, the doctrine of Iran’s theocracy. Prior, the role of clerics in Iran was similar to many other countries, serving as advisors and influencers. How could a society, formerly a sleepy backwater and playground of the Great Powers, suddenly develop one of the most complex governmental forms of modern times?

In every country, there is a primary currency of influence. In the U.S., financial prominence is strongly associated with social influence. In other countries, it could be crime, a warlord culture,  the notion of cultural aristocracy, “influencers”, how many books you’ve written, or simply entrenched domination of system. Post the 1979 revolution, influence in Iran follows, more than anything else, academic culture. Quoting from Iran, Foreign Policy, and Positivism,

In the holy city of Qom, clerics churn out commentary, the quantity, aesthetic quality, and popularity of which define the reputation and power of an ayatollah and his school. The anatomy of the state, the veins through which the power flows, and the currency of  legitimate rule are different from any other state in the world today. It is a hybridization of Plato’s Republic (compare Plato’s ruling “guardians” with Iran’s Guardian Council)  with a state structure that until 2005 occasioned significant expression of secular ideas.

In the West, we are accustomed to simple hierarchies of power, structured like pyramids, narrowing to a single individual at the top. Iran has multiple hierarchies which, at the top, vie for legitimacy in religious publications, selected public disclosure, and popularity. How these balance to modulate the exercise of power, and legitimacy of succession, are known only by the result.

This culture is peculiar to Shia Islam.  Due to the isolation of  the Arabian peninsula, Sunni Islam largely froze after the 11th century. When Islam arrived in Persia In the 9th to 11th centuries, it did not displace Persian culture; it hybridized it. The resulting amalgam, requiring elasticity, supported pluralistic interpretation and the famous institutional hypocrisy. Every Shia is required to choose a personal teacher, his source of emulation; the choice is his. The teachers emanate from the clerics of Qom. In the recent past, this has supported diversity of viewpoint, hidden from the Western observer by animosity to the West.

So the loud cries of the protestors lack influencers, or even any form of politics; subconsciously, they expect “literate” voices to step up, but none have appeared. From 1979, until the end of the Presidency of Muhammad Khatami in 2005, there was a visible diversity among the clerics of Qom, spanning the range from oppressive to shockingly liberal. Liberal clerics enjoyed some protection from severe sanction. After Khatami, the liberal elements faded from view. But might they still exist, in occult form? Shia Islam is, after all, based on the occult 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, the Shia version of the saviour.

A hint that they might: (Iranwire) Qom Without Senior Clerics Present.  Quoting,

Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, met with residents of Qom without the presence or cooperation of senior Shiite religious authorities…A reliable source said: “Normally, Shiite clerics are invited to such meetings, but this session was held very quickly and the clerics did not cooperate.”

The possibilities:

• They had prior engagements.
• A lack of desire to sacrifice themselves as front-men for an insoluble problem. Let Khameini do it; he’s near the end anyway.
• Genuine dissatisfaction with the extremes of the Khameini’s version of  theocracy. There are unsubstantiated claims that his removal was considered; possible, in theory, by the Assembly of Experts.
• Plotting in progress.

The abandonment of Velayat-e faqih is as likely as the repeal of Marbury vs. Madison. But the absence of the clerics, mirrored in the non-appearances in other branches of iran’s hydra-headed government, analogizes with Brinton’s incompetent use of force. We speculate about a process somewhat different from Brinton’s examples.

It centers on the reluctance of anyone, save the soon-to-be kaput Khameini, to be front-man for this train wreck. A stair-step descent from orthodoxy follows, devolving on  successive front-men, tending towards increasingly liberal, with Velayat-e faqih fading into the background, like a ceremonial monarchy.

Nobody wants to explain thirst for water to the masses. The stasis, when it occurs, will be determined by the desiccation of Iran. Iran needs water projects that can only be funded by a very healthy economy.