See (2017) Revolution in Venezuela. Quoting,

As noted, the accession of the extremists would be facilitated by rural sanctuary.  But “melting away” of the rebels into the countryside may be hindered by rural majorities of Maduro supporters. Open sources do not illuminate. This exhausts Brinton analogies…

The most defining attribute of a popular revolution is not ideology, but where it forms. The genesis of the French Revolution was in Brittany, but quickly spread to Paris,  from which it radiated nationally. The Russian Revolution began in the cities, followed by an arduous struggle to subdue the countryside.

The stalemate in Burma is a revolutionary situation, with a rural basis. To the extent that the War in Vietnam had elements of revolution, those elements were rural; Saigon was the last to fall.

The variable nature of the American Revolution derives from the 13 quasi states, each of which had their own centers of power, in what we would call, with the exception of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia,  small towns. But this is enough to define it as urban-centric.

To succeed, popular revolution, as distinguished from the palace coup, requires three things: grievance,  communication, and sanctuary.  Sanctuary allows participants in revolution to lead apparently legitimate lives, to communicate without the use of sophisticated technology, to acquire and conceal supplies, and to meet face-to-face for training and moral support, among other things. The lack of sanctuary has doomed prior attempts in Venezuela; the human elements  are too well known to Maduro’s power structure.

This bears on the strategic objective of invasion. If Maduro’s base were urban, it would be simple to make the case that seizure of Caracas “would cause the whole rotten edifice to collapse.” But Maduro’s base is rural, now enhanced by the web of cartels.

A careful assessment is required. If Maduro’s rural base, aided by the cartels, can survive decapitation of Caracas, an insurgency could grow, mimicking Vietnam. The devil is in the details of intelligence work. If done competently, without the political interference that characterized the run-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, it could:

• Provide assurance that force levels are adequate for a very high chance of complete success.
• Suggest that it could be a tough but ultimately successful slog.
• Warn us to stay out, at the peril of another Vietnam.

If we look at Venezuela through a lens deeply tinted by ideology and politics, we risk an expensive error. Let the intelligence analysts do their work without pressure for encouraging words. Their conclusions will be either golden, or save a lot of gold.

Pay attention to dissenters.