Edit, 5/14/2019. Since some readers may view this blog as a compilation,  Reuters) U.S. believes Iran proxies may be behind tanker attacks, official says. Quoting,

U.S. national security agencies believe proxies sympathetic to or working for Iran may have attacked four tankers off the United Arab Emirates rather than Iranian forces themselves, a U.S. official familiar with the latest U.S. assessments said on Tuesday.

This may derive from counting the Gadhirs in their berths, and other kinds of technical collection.

If the tankers were stationary, a dhow run by a proxy is very feasible. But since a dhow is  typically a slow boat, only a little faster than a tanker, precise navigation and some luck would be required for a moving interception. Would a modern hull planer be noticed?

The original post:

(Reuters) UAE says four vessels subjected to ‘sabotage’ near Fujairah port.

(CNN) Two Saudi oil tankers damaged in ‘sabotage attack,’ says press agency.

Quoting from US official: Iran has moved missiles to Persian Gulf,

Is there something more we can tease out of open source? A template based on the recent past gives insight into Iranian tactics, which emphasize surprise, asymmetry, and deniability.

There is indication that at least some of the attacks occurred while the tankers were under way. The locations, just outside the Strait of Hormuz, are convenient to Iran’s main naval facility, Bandar-e-Abbas. (Global Security) Yono Class / Ghadir Class Midget Submarine has plenty of detail.

What weapon was used? An unconventional answer is almost anticipated. While Iran’s engineering is third-rate, their tactical ingenuity is first-rate.

Supertankers are very hard to sink. Mine hits have occurred unnoticed by the crews. The damage level of these attacks does not exclude the typical weapons of naval warfare, mines and torpedoes. But strict deniability requires that the weapon contain little more than the explosive charge, and a little  miscellaneous steel. More than that leaves a residue that could be fished out for forensics.

For a possible solution, we must reach back to the U.S. Civil War, when the modern self-propelled “torpedo” did not yet exist. The spar torpedo was an explosive charge on the end of a stick.  It was rammed into the target ship, and exploded not instantly, but shortly after the attackers got away. Just before World War II, the Brits invented the limpet mine, which holds fast to the target with a magnet.

These are examples of weapons which leave behind little in the form of traceable scrap metal. Both are historically associated with midget (or littoral) submarines such as the Ghadir.

The following example stems from no particular insight, but is offered as an example of almost endless variations of improvisation.  The Ghadir can also carry an underwater diver delivery vehicle. Though tankers move slowly, a diver still risks getting caught in the wake of the tanker.  (At 15 knots, a 1000 foot tanker passes a fixed point in about 40 seconds.) An Iranian choice might be to tether the divers, or divers /vehicle, to the submarine with a rope, and go into reverse after the attachment. Or they could have put a limpet on the end of a stick.

Iran’s strategy now has another data point, suggesting that the missiles-on-dhows are reserved for reaction to overt retaliation by the U.S.   Yet Iran’s loss of oil revenue is so severe that only very significant setbacks might deter their strategy, which now appears to be grinding, deniable attrition. Iran assumes that most  U.S. weaponry is  not suited for deniable use.

Yet the cupboard is not entirely bare.

(Reuters) Venezuela’s Guaido would probably accept U.S. military intervention if proposed: paper.

Quoting,

“If the Americans were to propose a military intervention I would probably accept it,” he said in an interview with Italian daily newspaper La Stampa.

You’ve got your invitation.

(NBC) U.S. officials: Iran official OK’d attacks on American military. Quoting,

One U.S. official said Iran usually conceals the missiles and components when delivering them to the Houthis. These missiles are visible to overhead surveillance, leading to concerns Iran could attempt to launch missiles from the dhows. There are some indications they have mobile launchers on board, as well, one of the officials said.

Technical collections of the intelligence community are usually more informative than open source, except in one way, the gauging of intentions. But this quote is good for intentions:

…the Iranian regime has told some of its proxy forces and surrogates that they can now go after American military personnel and assets in the region, according to three U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence.

The  dhows may contain onboard launchers, as opposed to launchers for shore deployment. The IRGC have an operational suicide doctrine, which differs only in philosophy from the suicides of Islamic terror.  It is justified as a practical weapon, to be used when there is no alternative. In  challenge to U.S. naval power, this is now the case. Unlike the land launches by Houthis against the USS Mason, where the attackers could vanish, a dhow launch is a form of suicide.

So the argument of US official: Iran has moved missiles to Persian Gulf, based on deniability, is  compromised. It will become irrelevant if a missile is actually launched from a dhow. It would define the divide between Iran’s secular and religious components as more stark than even the imprisonment of Rouhani’s brother implies.

That argument also assumes the Iranians want a demonstration of success to motivate their suicide crews. The attack on the Mason did not provide this, because the attack did not reach the point of saturation of the Mason’s radar. But a close-in suicide attack, engaging the Phalanx CIWS system, has a  chance of causing at least minor ship damage. A swarm attack could do more.

Quoting,

“The intelligence is real,” said a senior Democratic congressional official briefed on the intelligence, “but the response seems wildly out of proportion.”

The deployment of a carrier strike group is appropriate. If the dhow threat becomes actual versus potential, as indicated by a missile launch, the best defense/deterrent is rapid elimination of the dhows.

The threat against U.S. land forces is not so easily countered. The strength and composition of these forces is not intended for large engagements. The isolated locations of U.S. forces within Iraq, combined with air power, provide some protection against concentration of opposing forces. But  freedom of movement, in small units in counterinsurgency operations, would go to zero.

The Kurd Referendum; Implications for U.S. Policy offers a prediction, from September 29, 2017, that centers on the Kurds. They may yet play a role; read down. But there are so many ways the cake can crumble:

…Unless Brinton’s sequence can be averted, the U.S. position will become untenable. The nature of extremists could make resolution impossible. The curtain on this conflict rises perhaps a year, or a bit more, from now.

Quoting from Trump wants U.S. military in Iraq to ‘watch Iran’: CBS interview,

The far west locations of the bases provide some insulation against sectarian strife. But how Iraq will fall apart is as hard as predicting how a goblet will shatter when dropped.

• • For a clean break into a few large pieces, the bases are an asset.
  • Bases are useful if there is enough coherence to request U.S. assistance, but the U.S. response would have to be massive.
  • With total shattering, and  many sharp pieces, the bases become “Mortarvilles”, exposed to grinding attrition.

Plan to Defeat ISIS Part 3; 1000 Troops to Kuwait; New Doctrine, outlines a doctrine that provides an alternative with some functionality in a non permissive environment. Quoting,

…None of these had geopolitical goals of the type pursued by the U.S. All of the above are characterized by the temporary seizure of territory. They were ephemeral. They offer suggestions as to how the U.S. can project power into a region with weak or nonexistent states, and hostile non-state forces:

• • Deploy very, very quickly.
  • Accomplish the objective, but without the usual finality or thoroughness.
  • Get out before non-state forces can react to the presence.

This “Doctrine of Ephemeral Deployment.” is not new. Von Clausewitz thought of it some time between 1816 and 1830.

While the U.S. military has the unique ability to maintain a presence in hostile environments, such as Afghanistan, it may be in circumstances that prohibit achievement of  foreign policy goals. If continued presence in Iraq is required, it may be necessary to dispose of constraints that stem from the concept of Iraq as a state in political balance:

• Reluctance to support Kurdish autonomy, if not independence.
• The idea that Sunni nationalism is in all forms a bad thing.

The current dilemma provokes an idea to be explored in the games of counterfactual history: U.S. foreign policy goals are too rigidly guided by strategic doctrine, to the neglect of opportunity and practicality.

(CNN) US official: Iran has moved missiles to Persian Gulf.

Iran’s government has a hydra head. Foreign policy initiatives are developed separately by different elements of the power structure, secular, and religious, with multiple  operators in Qom.

In the past, there has been speculation that the IRGC is a third power center, which may be why on April 21, Khamenei  replaced former IRGC head Mohammad Ali Jafari with Hossein Salami. In view of the risks of   missile use, Jafari may have “gone soft”, with concern for the health of his men.

The hypothesis that Khamenei et al. have decided for serious confrontation gets a boost from the (May 4, Al Jazeera) sentencing of President Rouhani’s brother, Hossein Fereydoun (Rouhani’s “eyes and ears”), to jail for unspecified crimes for an unspecified duration. This technique, with multiple imprisonments of his cabinet, was used against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to hamstring his administration until he could he could lose the 2009 election.

Is there something more we can tease out of open source? A template based on the recent past gives insight into Iranian tactics, which emphasize surprise, asymmetry, and deniability. Against the background of comparatively moderate posturing by the secular government, attacks against U.S. forces have occurred in a deniable manner.

Shiite militias in Iraq  received missiles in 2018. (Reuters) Exclusive: Iran moves missiles to Iraq in warning to enemies. There is no indication they have wasted them on shots at terrorists.  It has been stated that Iran has transferred manufacturing technology to militia. Although a militia could build a Palestinian Qassam rocket, the same is not possible for a Scud-type product.  The skills transfer can be no more than final assembly.

Yemen’s land mass and civil war have also served Iranian deniability.  The Scud-type missile launched from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, and the later Badr P-1 were provided by Iran. They were almost certainly moved into Yemen by boat. Houthi announcements imply they pushed the button themselves. But if Iranian technicians sighted the missiles and pushed the launch button, only precious HUMINT could tell the difference.

Since there is concern that the missiles being moved by boat could be launched from  boats, the Chinese designed C-802 Silkworm is implied. But a boat launch would not serve deniability. The C-802 is extensively deployed for land launch at the Strait of Hormuz.

Where could missiles be emplaced and launched in a deniable way? A locale must be lawless, buyable, and deniable. It must adjoin the Red Sea,  which must be transited by the U.S. forces that use the Suez Canal. Lawless locations are implied by pirate activity. Most of the pirate havens have been cleaned out. Pirate activity  persisted in  the Galmudug region of Somalia  till at least 2017. (FP)  Somalia’s Pirates Are Back in Business. This shows what is possible. perhaps further up the coast towards Bab el Mandeb.

Eritrea, inside the Red Sea, above and adjacent to the strait Bab el Mandeb, is geographically perfect.  The Eritrean Islamic Jihad implies contested territory that Iran could rent for missile emplacements, which can be effectively camouflaged. The narrowness of the strait facilitates visual spotting, helpful since the only Houthi controlled radar station was destroyed in the aftermath of the attack on the USS Mason.  See U.S.S. Mason; 3rd Missile Attack; Asymmetric Warfare with Iran. See also Houthi Missile Attacks on U.S. Destroyer; Iran Culprit, which considers the use of small spotter boats with optical sighting devices.

Iranian emphasis on  (Reuters) small-boat swarming attacks suggests there may be an element of coordination of attacks on naval targets with launches by Shiite militia against U.S. land forces.

Conclusion: If Khamenei gets the nerve to push the button, saturation attacks are possible from shore based missiles in the Red Sea. Coordinated  land attacks by Shiite militia may occur, particularly by those with an integrated Iranian component.

Iran has not overtly engaged the U.S. military since the 1988 Operation Praying Mantis, an event of the Tanker War. But if deniable attacks against a high value target, such as a carrier, are judged successful, Iran may be emboldened to launch from boats. They don’t plan to win, but neither do they aim to lose.

.

The problem of interception is hard for non-math people to understand. There is a gap between engineers and policy makers. What follows is an entertainment for a rainy Sunday, in the form of a board game. You will need:

• a checker board
• one red checker
• one black checker
• a coin for tossing
• some curiosity

A critic might deflect the insight as the result of “gross oversimplification.”  Don’t let him get away with it. Challenge him instead to offer his own board game.

• Start by placing a single red checker on the edge of the board, in either the black or white square closest to the middle. The red checker is the adversary’s hypersonic warhead, perhaps an Avangard.
• Place a black checker in the corresponding position on the opposite side. This corresponds to your interceptor missile.

A turn of play consists of one movement by the red checker, followed by one by the black checker. But each moves according to different rules. The move of each checker  consists of two steps:

• The first step of a movement advances a checker towards the opposite side of the board by one square.
• The second step  moves the checker to the right or left, a lateral displacement.
• The red checker must move two steps lateral, to the left or right, according to a coin toss. There is no red “player.” You are playing against the coin.
• The black checker must move one step to the left or right, your choice.

In this game, distances are not accurately represented.  It’s like a subway map. It’s on the critic to improve without resorting to the “reality is too complicated” defense.

The victory conditions:

• You win if you manage to place the black checker directly in front of the red checker. This corresponds to an impact, a “hard kill.”
• You lose if the red checker passes the black one, or reaches a parallel position. Your black checker cannot turn around and pursue.

The above is the hypersonic version of the problem. For the ballistic missile version, one rule is different.

• The red checker now proceeds straight across the board with no lateral moves.
• The black checker still makes lateral moves, representing noise in the system. Refine this if you wish, by replacing certain lateral movement with randomness. For example, a  lateral move occurs only if two heads come up in a row.

So the game is short. You could prolong it if you happen to have more checkerboards to arrange in a 2×2 square. As simple as it is, it illustrates the basic problem.

If you play the hypersonic version many times, you will sometimes win. On average, the black checker-interceptor will miss the red checker-warhead by a number related to the classic random problem of the “drunk’s walk”, or “random walk.”  Since you have the game, you don’t have to do any math. Get a coin out, play the game 10 times, and let me know.

Who knows? If you can figure out a way to win this game consistently, DARPA might be talking to you. In Part 3, we’ll explain how the game relates to the actual problem.

At least it doesn’t cost you any quarters.

A good place to start is Iain Boyd’s understated article, (CBS News) U.S., Russia, China race to develop hypersonic weapons.  It may be the only article in the popular press that offers measured assessment. But the most important statement, somewhat overshadowed by the depiction of U.S. inferiority, appears towards the end as a tentative suggestion. It’s worth highlighting with a quote:

“It is not clear if the types of interceptors that have been developed for defense against slower weapons will be effective against hypersonic missiles. Entirely novel approaches may be needed to defeat this new threat. Examples include high-power lasers and beams of electromagnetic energy.”

The article concludes with the catch-all,

“I believe that to avoid an important gap in U.S. defensive capabilities, American efforts in defense must at least keep up with the progress of other nations in developing hypersonic weapons.”

This nonspecific conclusion, descending to common sense, is the weakest point, because we are resource limited.

DARPA has initiated the proposal process for Glide Breaker, with the goal of impact-hard-kill against a particular category of hypersonic vehicles, boost-glide. This is problematic in several ways:

• While China strategic weapons appear to fall in the category of boost-glide, Russia’s Avangard system  is not; see Russia’s Hypersonic Missile; Reverse Engineering Secrets of Avangard.
• Boyd’s first quote, to which I add emphasis of certainty, implies that physical interception-hard-kill is (a) probably impossible. (b) If it is possible, changes to the adversary design would make it impossible.
• The hypersonic threat has such potential variation, and interceptors have such specificity, that the effort to counter is likely to end in resource exhaustion.
• Theodor Postol spent half a lifetime arguing the impossibility, on solid physical grounds, of effective ABM defense. He came as close to mathematical proof as one can  in the strategic realm. Supporters of missile defense found it unnecessary to refute, because decision makers don’t understand proofs. Now we have a second proof. As hypersonic vehicles are more difficult in all ways to intercept than ballistic missiles, interception is also impossible.

Decision makers are confused because, in tests, interceptors occasionally work. Some systems, such as THAAD, have performed remarkably well in tests, but are technically limited in ways the civilian policy-maker is unlikely to understand. Each interceptor is rigidly designed for a particular regime of altitude and velocity. The PAC-3 Patriot, specialized to ballistic missiles,  missed drones powered by the equivalent of  lawnmower engines, on multiple occasions. (Times of Israel) IDF: Patriot missile fired at incoming UAV from Syria, which retreats.

DARPA Glide-Breaker aspires to counter a new threat that is technically far more difficult than ballistic missiles, against which there is no practical defense. DARPA employs the services of engineers and scientists to solve strategic problems. These two fields,  engineering and strategy, employ  different modes of logic and habits of thought. When  engineering ventures into strategic thinking, and vice-versa, expensive errors of national policy can result.

The 1991 Gulf War provided early warning of this conundrum. SCUD missiles were so poorly engineered that they broke up in flight, with irregular trajectories that could not be matched by the Patriot system of that era. Frontline summarizes:

Such a Scud therefore came down with a relatively heavy warhead and a heavy motor, separated by the light empty fuel tank. It was structurally unstable and often broke up in the upper atmosphere. That further reduced its already poor accuracy, but it also made the missile difficult to intercept, since its flight path was unpredictable.

Simple randomization of the trajectory, which Avangard does in spades, was enough to defeat antimissile defense. Bad engineering defeats the specificity of good engineering.

One of the characteristics of the PAC-3 version is increased maneuverability  at high altitude, which resulted in reduced maneuverability at low altitudes. This improvement is vastly outclassed by the real or potential maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles, except in a specific part of the trajectory, which is specific to the adversary.

This implies that the adversary could, at relatively reduced cost, produce a core missile with different clothing aerodynamics. (The AIDS virus defeats the immune system by this strategy.) By varying the fuselage structure of a compatible core, flight characteristics become randomized. Which vehicle are we shooting at today?

To be a productive engineer, one has to stay focused on the problem. There are little problems and big ones, and a different focus on each. But the engineering mindset seldom extends to, “Should we be doing this at all?” Instead, the engineer offers a metric of success for the given specifications of a limited goal. Should we always buy? How are we thinking about this? This is strategy.

Part 1 ends with a joke quoted from Reddit.