CNN: U.S. has a Program to Hack North Korea Missiles. This is called “Left of Launch”

I wish this had been a “black program.” But “Left of Launch” has been peeking from behind the curtain since at least 2015. Quoting the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, (3/15/2015),

The “Left of Launch” strategy has been percolating over the past few years in the bowels of the Pentagon and government labs as part of an effort to reduce the cost of engagement of missile defense and to defeat an outnumbering force of offensive ballistic missiles that continue to proliferate around the world should they be used to threaten the United States and its allies.

Since CNN has given this a certain exposure, I feel I can add a little without helping North Korea. Left of Launch is practical against powers that cannot manufacture integrated circuits of a certain complexity. China, already self-sufficient or nearly so, is not in this class.

Back in the day, integrated circuits were relatively simple. A printed circuit board was required for just part of a small computer. For the most part, each chip performed a function so simple, it could be described by a “truth table”, that could be written down like a spreadsheet. You could test each chip and know exactly what it does.

The progress of integrated circuitry was so astonishingly rapid that it outran the words used to describe it. “LSI”, large scale integration, had at least a thousand gates. VLSI had many more. But some modern chips have more than a billion gates!

If you have something that complicated, and it has only a thousand pins (connections to the outside world) or so, can it be tested? Can the maker ever know whether it has any, shall we say, behavior, that is not in the specifications?

M.G. Karpovsky, a mathematician and digital logic  innovator, answered the question in the early 80’s. You can test about 71% of it. The rest is forever hidden. It would take something like the age of the universe to test all the combinations. Instead of being sure, it goes into your smartphone or laptop. At least it won’t catch fire like the battery.

A North Korean missile designer has two options. He can design the electronics for his rocket the really, really old way, using thousands of SSI (small scale integration) chips. It’s very tough to do this., and even harder to do it compactly. It was last done well by the famous names of U.S. computing. The rest gave up. Examination of scrapped Soviet electronics suggests their missiles might have not actually worked, so bad was their attempt. (Soviet missiles had a backup mechanical switch  so that if the missile actually hit the ground, it would at least not be a total dud.)

The modern alternative is to build the missile electronics out of Big Chips, with spiffy acronyms like ASIC, FPGA, and CPLD. All these chips are subject to the 71% rule. In the unknown 29%, these chips could be having their own conversation on the side. And Karpovsky has shown there is no way to test the truthfulness of a big chip.

Could Kim & Co. examine the chips with a microscope? It is doubtful they could learn anything, since an elaborate scanning system would be required for comparison with a “true” chip. Could Kim & Co. seek alternate suppliers? This is doubtful, since the technology remains in the hands of the G7. But as the technology diffuses, it could happen in the future.

This bomb discussion will end with an interesting insight into the politics of Afghanistan. In between, there will be blast tables provided by the BATF.

Foreign policy lives at the intersection of national interests, personalities, and the physical world. In the past few days, there has been a tremendous amount written about the MOAB, making it sound controversial, when it really is no more than a very jumbo fire cracker.

There is no reason to doubt General Nicholson’s statement (Reuters). Quoting:

“This was the first time that we encountered an extensive obstacle to our progress,” he said of a joint Afghan-U.S. operation that has been targeting Islamic State since March.

“It was the right time to use it tactically against the right target on the battlefield.”

Afghan and U.S. forces were at the scene of the strike and reported that the “weapon achieved its intended purpose,”, Nicholson said.

Some of the smaller websites have published outlandish statements on the destructiveness of the MOAB. It has even become political capital, as a symbol of unstoppable power, and a novel evil.  The former president of Afghanistan,  Hamid Karzai tweeted (Al Jazeera),

“This is not the war on terror but the inhuman and most brutal misuse of our country as testing ground for new and dangerous weapons.”…

“I vehemently and in strongest words condemn the dropping of the latest weapon, the largest non-nuclear #bomb, on Afghanistan by US…1/2″

Some students of international relations, a quintessential liberal arts major, may have slept through their “physics for poets” course. This is for them. It’s also for the reporter or digger who wants to understand whether a currently circulating attitude is the result of propaganda, political posturing, or a media-frenzy feedback loop. At this point, the words-in-print this past week about the MOAB could be as much as 10% of that devoted to  the sarin gas attack. But the two events are in no way commensurate.

Let us compare. The MK-84 2000 pound bomb has a 1000 pound case. On detonation, the case turns into shrapnel with a 400 yard lethal radius. The blast radius is much smaller than the shrapnel radius.

The MOAB contains 18,700 pounds of high explosive. It has a thin skin of aluminum. On detonation, the skin vaporizes. With possible exception of a few fragments of tail and bits of fin, there is no shrapnel. While high explosives differ in detail, they are more similar than different. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives finds no need to distinguish between the varieties of high explosive. The MOAB is not a fuel-air or thermobaric bomb, which would alter the discussion.

Now consult the BATF table, which provides safe storage distances for high explosives based on weight. Consult the column for a highway with more than 3000 cars per day, in straight line of sight of the explosive (unbarricaded.)

• If the 2000 pound bomb, containing 1000 pounds of explosive, does not have a case that turns into shrapnel, the safe storage distance  is 636 feet.
• For the MOAB, which contains 18,700 pounds of HE, the safe storage distance is about 1650 feet.

Note that 18,700 pounds of explosive increases the safe distance by only a factor of 2.5. But what is the lethal distance? Clearly, it must be a fraction of the safe distance. A bomb creates a brief pulse of overpressure. (CDC, pdf) Explosions and Refuge Chambers, Table 1 shows no direct damage to the human body by overpressure of 2 pounds/square inch.

At what distance is the overpressure greater than than 2 PSI?  From FEMA (Chapter 4, pdf)  EXPLOSIVE BLAST 4, figure 4.6,

• 2000 lb bomb with 1000 lb of explosive:  less than 260 feet.
• MOAB: less than 700 feet.

Somewhere inside the above circles, lethal effects occur. But the 2000 lb bomb has a lethal shrapnel radius of 1200 feet. The MOAB produces little or no shrapnel. We have the surprising conclusion that the MOAB is less likely, in many circumstances, to produce collateral casualties than the ubiquitous MK-84 bomb!

This is not a pleasant subject. Students of IR may prefer to contemplate Metternich or Bismarck. But there is actually an interesting takeaway. Hamid Karzai is still an important political figure in Afghanistan. His polarized comments on the Big Firecracker (I’m giving the MOAB my own name) indicate he is hedging his bets on the future of Afghanistan. As the situation in Afghanistan continues to evolve, he is a man to watch.

But this newly released footage of the MOAB in action could change my mind. What do you think?

NBC: U.S. May Launch Strike If North Korea Reaches For Nuclear Trigger. The Pentagon response is a dour not-quite-denial: (Reuters) Pentagon declines comment on NBC story on North Korea.

I have been thinking along these lines myself, but in the interest of not tipping the U.S. hand, I refrained. This is an open source blog, but it is also an easy digest for adversaries as well as friends.

In North Korea ICBM test — Trump says, “It’s not going to happen.”, I wrote:

This is the root of the conventional, almost unnoticed assumption, that any response to North Korea must be nonescalatory. This piece isn’t contradicting that, but merely drawing it out. If the strict regime of nonescalatory response were loosened, options exist. I don’t want to discuss them. I don’t want to impede a possible U.S. response in any way. So as interesting as the the subject is, I must forgo.

Since (NBC) “multiple senior U.S. intelligence officials” don’t leak stupidly, it’s kosher to discuss this in general terms. I still don’t want to draw  all the options. But in Xi-Trump meeting; Long Range; North Korea, I wrote:

Since Trump’s concept of achievements is that they are fungible, he reconsiders the South China Sea.  There are things you want to keep, and things you want to trade. It’s key to streamlining a business.

Maybe it’s trading material. I’ll finish this a little later.

One of the purposes of this blog is to make open source analysis a teachable skill. One of the most powerful predictive tools was devised by Benjamin Franklin: the list of pros and cons. The genius of it is that in the tally, each item on the list is given equal weight. Let’s apply that now to the question of a U.S. action against the North.

The Pros

• Trump’s vow to solve the problem of North Korea.
• His recent use of force in Syria.
• The enthusiasm of China state media with the Xi-Trump meeting, in spite of China’s awareness of the above. Hence, the “trading material” reference.
• Shared dislike of “Fatty Kim.”
• Possible awareness by South Korea of a grim future with the North.
• The conventional wisdom that force is off the table. Conventional wisdom is always vulnerable.

The Cons

• A possible attack by the North on the South, with all the ramifications.
• Refusal by the South to face up to the growing threat.

Notice that all the things that could happen to the South are not itemized. In the opposite extreme every casualty could be an element of the list.  In Franklin’s use of his method, tightly linked propositions are collapsed into a single list element. Each list element has the same weight.

Since the pros have it, 6 to 2, the estimate is that an attack has significant chance. It may have strange aspects.

China’s role may not be entirely passive.

Things that go BANG! have a great draw. You could say anything you want about the GBU-43, the “Mother of All Bombs”. Most readers in the U.S. will have a mildly euphoric feeling, similar to that from a bar of really good chocolate.

The MOAB is not the largest conventional bomb in the U.S. arsenal. The crown belongs to the GBU-57A/B, which is 50% heavier. The MOAB is “larger” only in the distinction of the largest amount of explosive. The GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator contains much less explosive, but it has a case designed to penetrate at least dozens of yards (with specialty concrete somewhat resistant)  into an underground target.

The MOAB is an air-burst bomb. For the surface targets for which it was designed, the GBU-43 provides unparalleled “shock and awe.” But since the target was a tunnel complex, why was the GBU-57 not used instead? Strike planners always have legitimate technical reasons, which have nothing to do with revenge. There were only 15 GBU-43’s in the stockpile, and now one less.

Because the MOAB is an air burst weapon, it has very limited effectiveness on a cave system. If the entrance is known, and happens to be a massive structure instead of a rabbit hole, it might be useful. A topographic depression could also focus the blast. But in practically all cases of underground targets, the GBU-57A/B is much more “total.”

There are a limited number of reasons why the GBU-43 was used instead of the GBU-57. It is  disappointing that the media leave this unexplored. All of the possible reasons are easily understandable by the general public.

The bomb, in and of itself, is treated as a news article. Bombs are not news articles; they are weapons.

WP via Reuters: FBI got court order to monitor ex-Trump adviser in Russia probe: Washington Post. Quoting,

The judge was convinced there was probable cause to believe Page was acting as an agent of Russia, the Post said.

Since this is now a “spy case”, let’s review the meanings and definitions of espionage. Many of us are familiar with the atomic spies, particularly Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917, and sentenced to death. Others charged under the 1917 Act were the 80’s spies, Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen.

The “illegals” of the Illegals Program, of whom Anna Chapman is the most famous, were charged instead under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which covers anyone acting in a “political or quasi-political capacity” for a foreign government. As far as FARA is concerned, Anna Chapman could have been no more than a lobbyist, or an influencer of any kind. If she was in the pay of a foreign government, she was obliged to register under FARA.

Most of the above illegals had fictitious identities. They communicated with Russia using the advanced tools of spy tradecraft, such as secret radios, steganography (messages hidden in pictures), etc. Yet they were not charged under the Espionage Act, because prosecution under the Act, which is disturbingly vague in some ways, has been mostly reserved for transfer of classified information, of military value, to a foreign power.

Suppose you’re a digger, and you have a source. One question you should ask is whether the suspected violations are in the category of espionage, as defined by the 1917 Act, or covered by FARA?

• A FARA case requires proof that the accused was paid by a foreign government, not a private company. In Russia, there is no practical difference, except where the money trail leads.
• The 1917 Act, which has been abused with prosecution failures, requires the passage of classified information.  The case of James Rosen  would be an interesting digression, but it has the taint of cross-party animus. That particular form of abuse is not relevant here because the administration is investigating itself.

We think of the “illegals” as spies, because that was their ultimate intent.  Inserted into American society with false identities, their ultimate purpose was to get close to the centers of power, close to individuals who could be blackmailed, or simply co-opted to provide “sensitive”, if not classified information. After the process of development matured,  an illegal could even influence  policy by direct personal persuasion. This is classic subversion.

The illegals  were spies in the incubator. Had they hatched, Espionage Act prosecutions might have resulted. Had suspected violations of FARA continued into the current administration, they might have transitioned to classic espionage, or subversion of the decision process. It’s the gleam in the eye of every spymaster. It’s what they live for.

 So if you live to dig, this is your question: What was going on?  FARA, Espionage Act, or both?  The FBI is trying to figure this out. Nothing has been disclosed in open source save for a few names, a computer server, a payments book in Kiev, and the quote of the Post article.

But now you have these points to guide your search:

• It is said that the discovery of Anna Chapman’s ring was unusual in the extreme. The most accepted explanation, that given by Chapman herself, is betrayal by the ring’s spymaster, Colonel Poteyev. So there’s a good chance there is another undiscovered or un-busted ring.
• Ring, no ring, or ring yet-to be, there was a Russian spymaster. To not have one would be too unusual. Russians have spymasters like we have Wawas.
• The ultimate goal of a spymaster who runs an illegals network is to infiltrate sleepers into centers of power and secrets.
• The spymaster had leaks, from the Hillary Clinton campaign, as trading material. The popular assumption is that the leaking was basically unilateral, to derail the Clinton campaign.
•  But there is something the spymaster desperately wants for his network,  something to motivate a trade.

What was it?

Reuters: Chinese state media cheer Xi-Trump meeting, say confrontation not inevitable. This was preceded by (Washington Post)Tillerson’s visit to Beijing, which the Post summarizes as a win for China. The Post notes  the remarkable pivot, from a campaign that demonized China and made a saint of Russia, to the polar opposite. In the old days, of which too much lingers in vocabulary, this would have been explained as “balance of power politics.” Today is radically different, because the real dangers come from tiny-to-small actors, state and non-state.

Ten years from now, it may be different again. China is much more adroit in the use of soft power than the U.S. The Trump administration seems blind to this: (Reuters) U.S. backs out of Latam development fund in sign of policy shift. In twenty years, it is likely that the railroads, airports, and mining concessions in South America will be controlled by China’s state capitalism.  When they have built the Nicaragua canal, South America will have passed to China’s sphere of influence. Since China has larger population and lower labor costs than the U.S.,  it would require U.S. strategists of extraordinary talent and insight to avert this.

But the current problem is with tiny actors. In Donald Trump’s Internal Conflicts, I wrote

… This short note offers the possibility, not probability, that Trump’s points of view will evolve in unexpected directions. It takes note of unexpected diversity in Trump’s selection of his inner circle and unusual expressions of thought…

…It is possible that Trump is changeable. By implication of the above, he may be the kind of person who will recognize, perhaps not immediately, that eradication of our liberal heritage will result in a one term presidency.

This was demonstrated first with foreign affairs, and more lately, with an expressed desire to cooperate with the Democrats.  In real estate all achievements are measured by the most fungible of commodities: money. (Classic examples of fungible commodities are oil, gas, grain, and pork bellies.) Except for the occasional problem of exchange controls, all money is equivalent. One tends to extend the familiar. So Trump may be the first president for whom achievement is fungible. If you can’t solve one problem (Russia), why not another?

Both pivots are the results of  extraordinary challenges. It appears that Trump’s initially naive attitudes towards Russia, and his overconfidence in his ability to judge people gave him a bad case of the leeches. There is the distinct possibility that, completely unknown to Trump, some of his campaign associates were accessories, though not spies themselves, to espionage against the U.S.

In fairness, people confidence in business means trying them out and if necessary, saying, “You’re fired.” The ship of state can’t be managed that way.  But only by turning away from Russia, by embracing the internationalist attitudes of the West, can Trump insulate himself from guilt by association.

Gone with the idea of rapprochement with Russia are the ideas floated in 2017 Predictions; Trump’s U.S./Russia Codominium/ New-New World Order. Excerpting,

• Deliberate exclusion of China from the codominium. As with a bad marriage, there will be attempt to blame the other partner. Subtle provocations will continue, with the motive to induce Chinese retaliation, providing further pretexts. But China will stick to soft power unless pushed to the wall.
• Promotion of economic interdependence between the U.S. and Russia.

and

• The Eurasian codominium warned of by Kissinger is averted.
• A profitable mercantile model with Russia is established.

Trump’s approach to China now reverts to the internationalist model. Without Russia as the favored natural resources state, it’s impossible to construct a self-sufficient codominium.

Since Trump’s concept of achievements is that they are fungible, he reconsiders the South China Sea.  There are things you want to keep, and things you want to trade. It’s key to streamlining a business.

Maybe it’s trading material. I’ll finish this a little later.

This is offered since it is known that Russia is interested in the opinions of independent analysts.

The posture of the Russian government after the U.S. missile strike on Shayrat Airfield is expected. It’s what is called  “boilerplate”, the repetitive material of a document that so closely follows form as to have no information content. At least, we hope that is all it is.

The Laws of War have been violated in Syria to the tune of 500,000 dead. To Bashar Assad, the arithmetic of a little sarin, of perhaps 80 more dead, is too small to matter. Perhaps it was inevitable that the choices of the West to ignore the the conduct of the Chechen wars, of the previous U.S. administration to ignore violation of the “red line”, and Rex Tillerson’s misstep, would encourage Russia to vigorously shield and possibly abet Assad’s actions.

We gave you a special pass on the Chechen wars. We knew your survival was at stake. Syria is too distant for that.

We have our Syrian frenemies, you have Assad, and the Syrian people have nothing. We are bound together by our common enemy, jihadism. What separates us, which is why you are interested in notes such as ours, is the degree to which we balance military advantage against the preservation of civilian lives. You have your calculus, and we have ours.

Our idea is that deterrence of chemical weapons use saves a meaningful fraction of lives in the Syria conflict. What’s a few thousand of 500,000? To us, it’s a lot.

There is danger to Russia in complicity with Assad. If it becomes viral in the Islamic populations of Russia and Central Asia that Russia is complicit in gas attacks, it could boomerang on Russia. This could easily happen, even if by your own standards, your hands are clean. Standards of personal hygiene vary widely.

Such a viral idea could not be controlled even by state media. In your justified fear of the potential for jihadism in Russia, do not make your problems worse by creation of a viral myth.

Reuters Syria Conflict blog: Syrian foreign minister says first air strike by Syrian army on Khan Skeikhoun on Tuesday was at 11:30am and targeted arms depot belonging to Nusra Front.

When an arms depot is bombed, there are inevitably secondary explosions of the high explosive munitions.  This produces what is known as a “fireworks display”, as the munitions cook off and launch randomly into the sky and surrounding neighborhoods. Advanced militaries design their depots to limit this, sectioned  by earthen berms to stop the spread.  In this case, the “depot” was a shack. In Russia denies Assad to blame for chemical attack, a 14 year old girl describes her experience of being less than 100 feet from the shack when the bomb hit it. Requoting the NY Times,

“…she saw an aircraft drop a bomb on a one-story building a few dozen yards away. In a telephone interview Tuesday night, she described an explosion like a yellow mushroom cloud that stung her eyes. “It was like a winter fog,” she said.”

A bomb hit the shack, and the only thing that exploded was the bomb itself? Without enough force to knock her off her feet or even dust her up a bit? She remarks on the effect to her eyes. The implausible coincidences:

• The Assad regime identifies the shack as an arms depot.
• The arms depot contains no conventional munitions.
• It just happens to contain chemical weapons.
• The bomb that hit exploded with weak force, as expected of a nerve agent munition.
• The victims exhibit symptoms of nerve agent exposure.
• There has been no evidence that Al Nusra has sarin.
• Contradicting  practical knowledge, the Assad regime implicitly claims that the bomb succeeds in mixing Al Nusra’s presumed sarin precursors instead of dispersing them.

Dear reader, please excuse the repetition. Sometimes, it makes a difference.

Reuters: Russia denies Assad to blame for chemical attack, on course for collision with Trump. Quoting,

Washington said it believed the deaths were caused by sarin nerve gas dropped by Syrian aircraft. But Moscow offered an alternative explanation that would shield Assad: that the poison gas belonged to rebels and had leaked from an insurgent weapons depot hit by Syrian bombs.

A previous assertion that rebel elements used sarin is Seymour Hersh’s piece, (LRB) Whose Sarin?, about the August 2013 incident near Damascus.  It shows the power of good writing. But it was completely refuted by the U.N. trajectory study cited by the (BBC) in Syria chemical attack: What we know. Quoting from (pdf, undocs.org) “Identical letters dated 13 December 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council”, document # A/68/663–S/2013/735,

8. In a letter dated 14 June 2013, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations reported to the Secretary-General, inter alia, its updated assessment alleging that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had used the chemical warfare agent Sarin in an attack on the Aleppo suburb of Khan Al Asal on 19 March 2013.

But the difficulties are  simplified for production of binary sarin, which is stored in a bomb or projectile as two chemicals that mix when the bomb is released or the projectile is fired. It is  possible that ISIS could operate a binary production facility. What would happen if the facility were hit by a bomb?

Mixing of the two precursors must be done thoroughly and quickly, or the production of sarin is low. A hit on a factory  would cause most of the contents to separate, rather than combine. Dispersion would be slow and wind driven. Nevertheless, if tons of a sarin precursor chemical, methylphosphonic acid dichloride, was stored on site and dispersed, fatalities could have resulted.

But most significantly, (NY Times) Worst Chemical Attack in Years in Syria; U.S. Blames Assad quotes witness Mariam Abu Khalil, who was extremely close to the impact:

“…she saw an aircraft drop a bomb on a one-story building a few dozen yards away. In a telephone interview Tuesday night, she described an explosion like a yellow mushroom cloud that stung her eyes. “It was like a winter fog,” she said.”

Her recounting does not describe a blast effect, the shock to the body from proximity to an explosion. The absence is specific to a chemical munition. This, and prior use of sarin by the Assad regime, effectively refute the Russian argument.

Reuters: Russian minister: 10 dead in St. Petersburg metro blast – Interfax. A sequence of questions results:

• Is this terrorism? The probability is high, but the question is necessary.  No decent government wants to exacerbate tensions because of the actions of the purely deranged.
• Is it related to the Caucasus? If it is terrorism, the probability is high.
• Are some of the actors Chechen? It gets interesting. As a whole the southern Caucasus contains elements that can be radicalized, but Chechnya is the radical state.
• If they are Chechen, are they disloyal to Ramzan Kadyrov, the personal dictator of Chechnya?

These are obvious questions. A more interesting one looms. In 2005, it became obvious that Putin had neutralized the threat of Chechnya by giving it a special deal. To do this, he had to find someone to deal with who could reciprocate in these ways:

• Personally guarantee that there would not be a Third Chechen War.
• Offer services to aid in control of the radical potential of the Caucasus as a whole. Co-opting of radical elements, and counterintelligence.

The extreme of this is that Kadyrov’s Chechnya is allowed strict Sharia law, and (Atlantic) personal dictatorship with impunity. Perhaps this would not have been required simply to end the Chechen wars. But it serves another function; it is an attractant to individuals who would otherwise fall into the jihadist orbit. That it has not been completely successful shows in the large numbers of Chechen members of ISIS. But it could have been worse. The more orthodox Chechnya is, the more resources are available to counterintelligence: informants, operatives, sympathies.

If the above questions are affirmed, Kadyrov’s co-opting has failed Putin twice: in the death of Boris Nemtsov, where close associates of Kadyrov were implicated, and in these metro bombings. The successes, prevention of repetitions of the 1999 apartment bombings, are of course not known. The Russians do not feel quite the obligation of due process for terrorists as in the West.

To neutralize at least some of the perpetrators of the Nemtsov assassination, Russia mounted a police/paramilitary raid into Chechnya with assets from neighboring oblasts. Kadyrov made a statement  that sounded like (WSJ) an open rebellion against the Kremlin, which (RFE)  publicly rebuked him. An RFE article,  The Warlord Checkmates The Tsar, offers a variety of opinions  on the degree to which Putin uses Kadyrov and in turn is manipulated by him.

Some of the ideas tend towards conspiracy, failing Occam’s Razor. The current relationship can be most easily explained as toleration of an ethnic attractant to co-opt Islamic extremism, blunt, and absorb it. It hasn’t been absorbed at all, but perhaps Putin’s solution should be measured by how much worse things could be.

The Chechnya bargain cannot be undone without a third war. Instead, Russia’s response is to strengthen her internal defenses. The merger of the SVR and the FSB security services into a Ministry of State Security will enable a complete internal judicial process, including liquidation, hidden from the public.

This new Russian police-state will facilitate the take-down of widespread terrorist networks, because the target networks will not realize what is happening to them. It’s a terrible thing, to abolish civil liberties, to bring back the troika, because Russia contains a hostile, literally murderous enclave.

But Putin would ask, and this deserves to be part of his Apology: Would you rather have a Third Chechen War?