See (2017) Revolution in Venezuela. Quoting,

As noted, the accession of the extremists would be facilitated by rural sanctuary.  But “melting away” of the rebels into the countryside may be hindered by rural majorities of Maduro supporters. Open sources do not illuminate. This exhausts Brinton analogies…

The most defining attribute of a popular revolution is not ideology, but where it forms. The genesis of the French Revolution was in Brittany, but quickly spread to Paris,  from which it radiated nationally. The Russian Revolution began in the cities, followed by an arduous struggle to subdue the countryside.

The stalemate in Burma is a revolutionary situation, with a rural basis. To the extent that the War in Vietnam had elements of revolution, those elements were rural; Saigon was the last to fall.

The variable nature of the American Revolution derives from the 13 quasi states, each of which had their own centers of power, in what we would call, with the exception of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia,  small towns. But this is enough to define it as urban-centric.

To succeed, popular revolution, as distinguished from the palace coup, requires three things: grievance,  communication, and sanctuary.  Sanctuary allows participants in revolution to lead apparently legitimate lives, to communicate without the use of sophisticated technology, to acquire and conceal supplies, and to meet face-to-face for training and moral support, among other things. The lack of sanctuary has doomed prior attempts in Venezuela; the human elements  are too well known to Maduro’s power structure.

This bears on the strategic objective of invasion. If Maduro’s base were urban, it would be simple to make the case that seizure of Caracas “would cause the whole rotten edifice to collapse.” But Maduro’s base is rural, now enhanced by the web of cartels.

A careful assessment is required. If Maduro’s rural base, aided by the cartels, can survive decapitation of Caracas, an insurgency could grow, mimicking Vietnam. The devil is in the details of intelligence work. If done competently, without the political interference that characterized the run-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, it could:

• Provide assurance that force levels are adequate for a very high chance of complete success.
• Suggest that it could be a tough but ultimately successful slog.
• Warn us to stay out, at the peril of another Vietnam.

If we look at Venezuela through a lens deeply tinted by ideology and politics, we risk an expensive error. Let the intelligence analysts do their work without pressure for encouraging words. Their conclusions will be either golden, or save a lot of gold.

Pay attention to dissenters.

(CNN) How Trump-Zelensky meeting turned acrimonious over demands for territorial concessions. Quoting,

The current estimate is that Trump intends to order an invasion, pending the satisfaction of certain prerequisite conditions.

The widely held opinion is that Trump is bluffing. Bluffing would be ineffective, since Maduro is hostage, as well as patron, of the cartels, with no room to respond to U.S. demands.

The decision is contingent on certain data  from the field not yet supplied to the administration.

The anticipated force is one corps,  an ambiguous term, perhaps 40,000 to 80,000 ground troops. This is likely a point of contention within the administration.  (The Hill) Top admiral’s retirement sets off alarm bells over Caribbean boat strikes. The resignation of Adm. Alvin Holsey, head of U.S. Southern Command, widely thought related to the boat strikes, may have this weightier motivation. In the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. troop levels reached 697,000. The multinational forces of the 2003 invasion of Iraq peaked at 160,000. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was subsequently criticized for barely adequate force levels, which were supported by covert buy-offs of defending Iraqi forces.

So how could an invasion of Venezuela proceed with such small ground force levels? With these assumptions, which are subject to challenge:

• After seizure of Caracas, organized resistance would cease.
• Caracas is only 7 miles from the sea, though separated from the coast by a mountain range ranging from 2000 to 4000 feet, through which passes a single road. Combined air/ground forces would presumably overcome the advantage of the terrain to the defenders. By contrast, Baghdad is 280 mile straight line from the 2003 zero-line.
• There is a 60 mile lowland alternate route from the east, useful for misdirection.
• The 1989 invasion of Panama involved similar troop levels.
• Defender buyoffs are comprehensive and effective.
• The whole edifice is rotten, historically a risky gamble, but it may be true.
• Current U.S. battle doctrine, full-spectrum dominance, is a force multiplier.
• The presumed magic of “warrior ethos” is real.
• Reversing the ironic observation of  theorist Carl von Clausewitz, the Venezuelans do what we want them to do.

Holsey’s resignation suggests a time line. There is one open source fact that signals  the seriousness of intent. You can figure it out. Get off social media and dig.

The challenge will be to keep it real. Keep workin’ it, through the highs and lows.

***Trump Gets His MoJo Back!!!***

Since Israel and Hamas have some form  of preliminary agreement that will presumably result in release of all hostages, does this mark the end of Hamas as a major force?

For a nontraditional analysis, see Israel, Qatar Strike, which identifies the Gaza tunnels as a constant of the problem, beyond which solutions cannot progress as long as they remain. Those steeped in the liberal art of diplomacy may find this unconvincing. In ( CNN) Fareed Zakaria says this is the ‘million dollar question’ in Gaza deal, Zakaria says that Hamas has nothing left, and Israel holds all the cards.

If Arab terrorism were ruled by Western rationalism, this might be true.  We may have to remind ourselves with every new analysis that this is not the case. But what do we insert in its place? Guidance comes from a remarkable precedent. Since the First Intifada, which spans 1987 to 1993, no Arab terror group or subversive organization has been extirpated, by either Arab countries, israel, or the United States.

Al Qaeda is regrowing. (The Hill, 10/7/25)) US military kills senior al Qaeda-affiliated attack planner.

In spite of the elimination of their charismatic leader and falsification of his revelatory teachings, ISIS still holds territory in Syria and Yemen. It has a growing presence in Afghanistan.

Though less visible than during the brief tenure of Mohamed Morsi as president of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood remains the transnational subversive stratum of the Arab World, so feared its known exponents are often murdered.

Remember the Black September Organization, which seemingly vanished? In reality, it was a mere pseudo-pod, a cover identity for Fatah, which still exists. The PLO still exists. Hezbollah exists.

Arab countries which give the appearance of freedom from the some or all of these groups have achieved such with mukhabarat terror first brought to the highest pitch by Syria’s Hafez al-Assad. So efficient were the Syrians under the elder Assad, so confident were they of their measures, that Syria could then be entered by any Arab without a passport.

What was done in Syria can be done in Gaza. But by who, and who will sanction torture to prevent a reemergence? No decent international body, no regional coalition could accept the burden and stain of the required severity of repression.

One can sketch the resurrection of Hamas.  A subversive movement becomes a mafiesque second government, which then expels the legitimate authority:

• First, they own the sidewalk.
• Next, a mosque, then a street, then a business, such as trash removal.
• A neighborhood follows, with their services supplanting official.
• Political organization, with a neighborhood nucleus.
• With insertion into minor political roles, state capture begins.
• Assassinations paralyze the legitimate government.
• The banner, of either Hamas or a surrogate, is raised, with demands for power sharing.
• A regional coalition attempts intervention. The Gaza tunnels thwart this.
• The coalition negotiates a face-saving withdrawal.
• The legitimate government flees.

One could argue that Hamas would lack the popular sympathy enjoyed during the 2007 Battle of Gaza , when they kicked Fatah out.

They don’t need it.

(CNN) Trump calls on Israel to ‘stop the bombing of Gaza’ after Hamas agrees to hostage negotiations.

This is merely a tactical move by Hamas, from the realization that the hostages are a liability, not an asset.  The same goes for Israel, for which there is an unresolved physical reality. See Israel, Qatar Strike. Quoting,

If the tunnels were comprehensively eliminated, the problem of Hamas would be reduced to manageable proportions. The tunnels are the constant of the problem.

This brings to mind the death of the famously devious French diplomat, Talleyrand. Upon learning of his rival’s death, the  Austrian diplomat Metternich said,  “I wonder what he meant by that?”

Wonder, indeed. Perhaps A.I. can give us the answer that has eluded since 1838.

***Die Hard***